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Abstract
Social network sites (SNSs) have become very popular, with more than 1.39 bil-
lion people using Facebook alone. The ability to share large amounts of personal
information with these services, such as location traces, photos, and messages,
has raised a number of privacy concerns. The popularity of these services has
enabled new research directions, allowing researchers to collect large amounts
of data from SNSs to gain insight into how people share information, and to
identify and resolve issues with such services. There are challenges to con-
ducting such research responsibly, ensuring studies are ethical and protect the
privacy of participants, while ensuring research outputs are sustainable and can
be reproduced in the future.
These challenges motivate the application of a theoretical framework that
can be used to understand, identify, and mitigate the privacy impacts of emer-
ging SNSs, and the conduct of ethical SNS studies. In this thesis, we apply
Nissenbaum’s model of contextual integrity to the study of SNSs. We develop
an architecture for conducting privacy-preserving and reproducible SNS stud-
ies that upholds the contextual integrity of participants. We apply the archi-
tecture to the study of informed consent to show that contextual integrity can
be leveraged to improve the acquisition of consent in such studies. We then
use contextual integrity to diagnose potential privacy violations in an emerging
form of SNS.
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There’s a path stained with tears,
Could you talk to quiet my fears?
Could you pull me aside,
Just to acknowledge that I’ve tried?
…
And as your last breath begins,
You find your demon’s your best friend.
And we all get it in
The end.
Scott Matthew, In The End
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Social network sites (SNSs) have quickly become one of the widest-used ap-
plications on the Internet. A range of services has been enabled that allows
people to share content with their peers, such as messages, photos, and their
current location, with the structure of people’s interpersonal relationships rep-
resented as a graph of connected peers. As of 2014, 63% of UK adults owned a
smartphone [102], while 47% of adults used SNSs. Of those, 82% of 16-24 year
olds are SNS users [101]. With such services achieving near-ubiquity among a
generation of people, it is important to consider the implications they present.
The quantities of personal information that can be collected and shared with
others using these services has raised many privacy concerns. The data shared
on SNSs may not be considered appropriate or relevant to everyone in a per-
son’s social network, placing responsibility on the individual to correctly con-
figure the privacy settings for each disclosure such that sensitive data are not
inadvertently exposed to the wrong audience [76]. The protection of individu-
als’ privacy is not just dependent on users’ comprehension of these settings,
but on the trustworthiness of their peers and the SNS itself. While people’s
attitudes towards their privacy may change, these settings are static, meaning
that people may subsequently regret the posts they have previously made [136],
again placing responsibility on the individual to police their historic disclosures.
As well as trusting that the service does not inappropriately share their users’
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data [71], they are trusted to protect data from external attack, which is con-
sidered a growing threat [108].
These issues, and the difficulty of defining privacy itself, has motivated
many attempts to solidify privacy within a theoretical framework. Helen Nis-
senbaum’smodel of contextual integrity is one such effort [100], which determ-
ines privacy violations emerge when people’s context-specific norms about ac-
ceptable information sharing are not met. The model can be used as a dia-
gnostic tool to identify potential sources of privacy breaches by determining
when existing norms are perturbed by a new process that changes what types
of information are collected and transmitted.
The popularity of SNSs, and concern about such privacy challenges has opened
new research directions concerning their design and the behaviour of the people
who use them. These studies can provide useful insights, but it is important to
consider how to conduct such research responsibly, by ensuring its outcomes
benefit a variety of stakeholders, and society at large [119]. Acknowledging both
the ethical challenges associated with collecting and processing such sensitive
data, and the sustainability challenges of making such research reproducible in
the future, can make progress towards making SNS research more responsible.
As there is no consensus about whether all studies using social network
sites constitute human subjects research, there is a lack of consistency about
the amount of ethical oversight such research receives, with previous stud-
ies attracting attention because of failures to preserve the anonymity of par-
ticipants [147], or gaining their informed consent [49]. This places great re-
sponsibility on researchers to adequately protect their participants, specifically
when considering sharing data with others, which could reveal sensitive in-
formation about participants, with it being possible to reidentify participants
when data are not sufficiently sanitised [97, 22].
Conducting research responsibly can also be enhanced through steps to im-
prove its sustainability: ensuring research artefacts continue to be usable and
meaningful in the future. Making experiments reproducible, which has long
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been considered a fundamental part of the scientific method [78], can signi-
ficantly contribute to this. SNS research is particularly difficult to execute in
a reproducible manner, however, as the design of services often change or are
made obsolete, requiring constant maintenance of code that accesses SNS data,
and in some cases, experiments simply cannot be run again. Additionally, lim-
ited reporting of methodological details such as how participants were sampled,
or how informed consent was sought, can make it more difficult to reproduce
such studies, with no standards for encoding and sharing the workflow of SNS
experiments being adopted.
As the use of SNSs continues to rise, new services emerge, with at least 200
operating as of 2015 [140]. With outstanding privacy challenges with the ser-
vices themselves, and concerns about the responsible conduct of SNS studies,
it remains unknown whether a single conceptual framework can be leveraged
to identify and address these issues in a holistic manner. While Nissenbaum’s
model of contextual integrity has been used to investigate a range of privacy
concerns [42, 59, 75, 113], it has not been used to identify privacy breaches
in emerging SNSs where existing norms might be disrupted. Furthermore,
whether it can be used to evaluate and improve the conduct of SNS research
remains unknown.
In this thesis, we address the following research questions:
RQ1: Is contextual integrity an appropriate framework for understanding and
mitigating ethical concerns in SNS research?
RQ2: Can contextual integrity be used in the evaluation of SNSs to detect and
mitigate their privacy impacts?
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1.1 Thesis statement
We make the following thesis statement:
Contextual integrity can be used to conduct reproducible and privacy-
preserving experiments using social network sites, and can detect po-
tential privacy violations in new services in order to mitigate their
impact.
In support of this, we make three contributions. We demonstrate that:
1. Using an architecture informed by contextual integrity to conduct SNS
studies can better protect the privacy of participants and lead to more re-
producible experiments, than directly accessing the APIs provided by SNSs.
2. Contextual integrity can be leveraged to acquire consent in SNS studies to
better meet the expectations of participants and mitigate the ethical issues
associated with failing to gain informed consent.
3. Contextual integrity can be used to detect privacy breaches in emerging
SNSs, and to identify how the design of these services can be altered to
avoid such violations.
1.2 Outline
This thesis is structured as follows.
Chapters 2 and 3 outline the research context, and the state of the art.
• Chapter 2 introduces the range of social network sites we will study, the
privacy challenges associated with these services, and the ethical chal-
lenges associated with conducting research into SNSs.
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• Chapter 3 examines the recent literature that attempts to resolve some of
the challenges we identified in Chapter 2, noting the open problems we
will address.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 describe our three contributions to support our thesis.
• In Chapter 4, we introduce an architecture we have developed to improve
the ethical conduct of SNS studies, the effectiveness of which we demon-
strate by reproducing an existing study.
• In Chapter 5, we tackle a specific ethical challenge in SNS consent, demon-
strating that a method for acquiring consent for SNS studies that main-
tains contextual integrity can meet the expectations of participants while
reducing the burden placed on them.
• In Chapter 6, we conduct two case studies to show how contextual in-
tegrity can be used to detect breaches in two types of SNSs, and how the
framework guides the design of the services to mitigate these breaches.
Finally, we conclude with a summary of the contributions we have made,
and outline directions for future research.
1.3 Publications
This thesis is entirely my work, but has been supported by a number of col-
laborators. Throughout this thesis, I use the word “we” to acknowledge the
contribution these collaborators have made to this work.
During the course of my PhD, I have contributed to the following public-
ations. Where I am first author, I have been chiefly responsible for the core
contributions of experimental design, implementation, and execution of stud-
ies and analyses, and it is this work that I present in this thesis.
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• Luke Hutton and Tristan Henderson. “Towards reproducibility in online
social network research”. In: IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Com-
puting (2015). doi: 10.1109/tetc.2015.2458574
• Luke Hutton and Tristan Henderson. “Making social media research re-
producible”. In: Proceedings of the ICWSMWorkshoponStandards andPractices
in Large-Scale Social Media Research. Oxford, UK, May 2015
• Luke Hutton and Tristan Henderson. ““I didn’t sign up for this!”: In-
formed consent in social network research”. In: Proceedings of the 9th In-
ternational AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM). May 2015. url:
http://tristan.host.cs.st-andrews.ac.uk/research/pubs/icwsm2015.pdf
• Luke Hutton and Tristan Henderson. “An architecture for ethical and
privacy-sensitive social network experiments”. In: SIGMETRICS Perform-
ance Evaluation Review 40.4 (Apr. 2013), pp. 90–95. doi: 10.1145/2479942.
2479954
• Luke Hutton, Tristan Henderson and Apu Kapadia. ““Here I Am, Now
Pay Me!”: Privacy Concerns in Incentivised Location-sharing Systems”.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we outline the nature of the social network sites that we study in
this thesis. We also discuss the prevailing methodological approaches adopted
in the research of such systems, and the ethical challenges associated with these
methods.
2.1 Social network sites
In its early years, the World Wide Web was a distributed repository of largely
static information, where the majority of users only consumed content [19].
Beginning in the early 2000s, the development of technologies such as AJAX
allowed more sophisticated applications to be delivered through Web browsers,
encouraging users of the Web to become creators. These applications allowed
people to share photos, write blog posts, and comment on the content generated
by others, adding a social dimension that had been largely absent from the Web
until then, in a movement widely known as “Web 2.0” [19].
The introduction of smartphones with large displays and touch capabilities
has led to further developments in the Web. The computational power and rel-
atively high-resolution displays of these devices reduced the gap between mo-
bile phones and computers, with the ability to render websites at similar fidelity
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to their desktop counterparts [15]. The quick adoption of smartphones coupled
with acknowledgement of their limitations with respect to input modalities and
display size, has led to efforts to optimise websites for such devices, and to de-
liver native applications which can use their full capabilities and achieve higher
performance [14]. The additional capabilities of smartphones, such as location-
sensing and cameras, coupled with the increasing availability of high-speed
mobile Internet connections, has enabled new services which allow people to
share photos, videos, and their current location [15]. These abilities have led to
a change in how people access the Web, with more than 37% of all Web traffic
coming from mobile devices as of February 2015 [121].
The social functionality which began to emerge in websites evolved into a
set of applications that were designed around the concept of managing a set
of friends with which information could be shared: the social network site.
In 2007, boyd and Ellison defined social network sites as Web-based services
which meet the following criteria [11]:
1. Users can create a profile, which might be public or visible to a subset of
people.
2. Users can curate a list of other users of the service they are connected to.
3. Users can traverse these connections, and the connections made by others,
to see their profiles and other content.
This definition is intentionally sparse. While individual SNSs vary in design
and purpose they share some structural components. All provide a service over
the Internet, and implement an eponymous social network; a graph where
nodes are individual people, and the edges a semantically-appropriate social
connection between them, such as friendship or physical co-location. In many
cases, it is the semantics of the connections within that network which define
the purpose of the service.
Launched in 2004 as an SNS for students at Harvard University, Facebook
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Figure 2.1: A screenshot of a Facebook profile, illustrating its implementation of the
three fundamental SNS concepts: 1) A profile consisting of content decided by the user.
2) A list of friends curated by the user. 3) Connections between friends are exposed,
allowing traversal between profiles.
has rapidly grown to become one of the world’s most popular SNSs, with 1.39
billion active users as of December 2014.1 It allows its users to share and engage
with photos, videos, links to websites and text-based status updates posted by
peers, via its website or mobile applications, the latter becoming increasingly
popular, as we will discuss later. Facebook meets the SNS criteria identified
by boyd and Ellison through one of its core products, Profile. As shown in Fig-
ure 2.1, the product aggregates content published by the user, which is visible to
an audience determined by its author. The profile exposes the “friends list” of
the user, an egocentric social network of their direct connections. This mech-
anism allows the user to traverse profiles of their friends, with mutual friends
and recommended connections surfaced through the structure of the global so-
cial network. While initially designed to represent friendships between college
students, this concept has extended to model familial relationships, dynamics
between colleagues, or even between businesses and their customers. Des-
1Facebook company information: http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
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Figure 2.2: A screenshot of a Last.fm profile, illustrating how these same three SNS
concepts manifest in more niche services, with: 1) A profile consisting of attributes
disclosed by the user. 2) A list of friends curated by the user. 3) Friends can post
messages on each other’s wall, encouraging engagement between profiles.
pite the development of new products by Facebook, the fundamental purpose
of the profile is remarkably similar to that of its predecessors, such as Friend-
ster (founded in 2002) and MySpace (founded in 2003). These services, among
many others which emerged in the early 2000s, have waned in popularity since
Facebook’s dominance took hold, but despite superficial advances, Facebook’s
structure deviates little from these services.
boyd and Ellison’s SNS model holds true for services which deviate from the
approach of Facebook, and its ancestors. One such example is Last.fm, which
forges communities around shared music interests. Despite carving out a re-
lative niche, its structure is again consistent with that of Facebook’s Profile
product, as shown in Figure 2.2. Last.fm’s core offering is to track the music
people listen to on their personal devices, and recommend new artists through
collaborative filtering techniques, illustrating how SNS concepts can be embed-
ded in a range of applications. The service identifies users with similar tastes
and encourages them to become friends, making it easier to follow each other’s
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Figure 2.3: A screenshot of a Twitter profile, showing how it implements the three SNS
concepts: 1) A profile consisting of tweets shared by the user. 2) The directed nature of
the Twitter graph means that the indegree and outdegree of each user is reported in-
dependently, with the outdegree (“following”) determined by the user. 3) The profiles
of others can be traversed to view the tweets they have recently published.
activity on the service.
While boyd and Ellison do not make explicit references to the graph which
underpins the connections between these services, the design of this graph has
significant implications for the services built on top of them. The SNSs we have
discussed so far all employ an undirected graph in their core network, where
friendships are modelled as symmetric connections.2 A friendship, initiated by
one party, must be accepted by the other to forge a connection on the graph,
and allow content to flow bidirectionally between peers. Another major SNS,
Twitter, does not employ this approach.
Depicted in Figure 2.3, Twitter allows users to broadcast short text mes-
sages, known as tweets. Its underlying social graph is directed, allowing users
to choose which of their peers to follow, without necessarily being reciproc-
ated. This approach allows people to access a stream of tweets from the users
they follow, enabling an asymmetry where a user’s reach is dictated by their
number of followers, and not by the size of their egocentric network, enabling
2Facebook’s graph can also include directed connections, allowing users to follow updates
from brands and celebrities, but not in its core frienship model.
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celebrities and large organisations to reach a large audience. This subtle design
choice has enabled a new class of communication, including more social forms
of advertising which we will consider later, but again reflects the robustness of
boyd and Ellison’s definition.
Privacy challenges
The sudden popularity of SNSs, and their ability to connect large numbers of
people around the sharing of potentially sensitive information has given rise to
a number of privacy risks.
Bourdieu defines social capital as the potential resources that can be extrac-
ted from a network of mutually acknowledged relationships, allowing people
to use such relationships to advance their own interests [10]. SNSs encourage
the development of social capital between users by making it trivial to disclose
personal information to a large social network, while being able to easily access
the disclosures made by others. Koroleva et al. propose a conceptual model in
which disclosures and reciprocity build social connectedness to create higher
value social networks and provide emotional support between peers [69]. The
SNS operator relies on its users to keep populating it with new content to avoid
stagnancy, and people are compelled to disclose personal information on an
ongoing basis to keep building social capital with their peers. This relation-
ship can create a tension. The design of the SNS may compel its users to share
more than they would otherwise want to [136], in order to satisfy its own ob-
jectives, while users may feel pressure from their peers to keep making dis-
closures to build social capital [124]. One challenge with managing disclosures
to an SNS is that of “context collapse”. When communicating face-to-face,
people constantly adjust their self-presentation based on their context, partic-
ularly who they are with, perhaps adopting a more formal tone with their em-
ployer than their close friends, for example. Marwick and boyd note that most
SNSs, however, are constructed around an egocentric social network in which
all peers of the user are considered equal, collapsing these nuanced contexts into
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Figure 2.4: The Facebook audience selector allows a user to decide which subset of their
social network can see the content they publish, or whether to make it publicly ac-
cessible. In this case, the user has created many friends lists that allow content to be
targeted at predetermined subsets of people, however controlling the audience in such
a way is not common [76].
one [85]. As SNSs depend on ongoing disclosures, they usually encourage users
to broadcast disclosures to their entire social network, without consideration
for whether that disclosure is relevant, of interest, or appropriate to everyone.
As Marwick and boyd argue, this leads either to blandness where people only
make lowest-common denominator disclosures, or over-sharing of informa-
tion to a subset of the user’s audience. Marder et al. argue that the difficulty
of balancing these distinct social spheres can lead to social anxiety, leading to
a withdrawal from making disclosures if over-exposure is anticipated [83].
The causes and problems associated with over-sharing have been widely
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discussed in the literature. One issue are the user interfaces used by SNSs to
let users choose the audience for their disclosures. In an attempt to mitigate
context collapse, Facebook provides fine-grained control of the audience for
individual disclosures, allowing users to explicitly choose which of their peers
can and cannot see a post, or to create lists of people who are able to see subsets
of content, as shown in Figure 2.4. Liu et al. found, however, that only a third
of people change the default audience of their posts, which means for most
people, all peers in the social network can see it. More concerningly, the actual
audience is the same as the user’s expected audience in only 37% of cases, with
content exposed to a larger audience in most cases [76].
Trust is an important component governing disclosures in SNSs, and is con-
sidered to be a key factor in people’s privacy calculus when using SNSs. Privacy
calculus can be considered the risk-benefit analysis people perform when de-
ciding whether to disclose information, balancing the potential effects of being
exposed against the utility that might be gained [73]. Krasnova et al. model
disclosure behaviours considering the trust people place in their peers, and in
the integrity of the SNS itself, as a factor in the privacy calculus when choosing
to make a disclosure [71]. Attacks have been demonstrated which can com-
promise this trust relationship, and risk the privacy of users. Nagle and Singh
found that Facebook users are more likely to accept friend requests and share
sensitive information with a stranger if they have a mutual friend in the social
network [96], taking advantage of the implicit trust signal given by the mutual
friend.
The temporal robustness of privacy settings on SNSs has also been high-
lighted as a source of concern. Decisions about the audience of content are
made at the time of the disclosure, and are likely never revisited [81]. In the
meantime, the audience may have changed, if the user has added new peers
to their social network, and the user’s attitude towards that content may have
changed. Wang et al. found that people commonly regretted past Facebook
posts, if the audience of their disclosures was greater than they intended, or
if the posts dealt with sensitive issues such as drug or alcohol use which the
14
poster later felt embarrassed by [136], while Bauer et al. found that people of-
ten wanted to restrict the audience of their posts, even within a week of having
shared them [5].
2.2 Location-based social networks
The increasing popularity of smartphones has enabled a new class of SNS, de-
signed around the purpose of sharing location data with one’s social network.
Zheng defines location-based social networks (LBSNs) as a form of social net-
work site, where people can record their current location, and accumulate a
profile of historic location records. These are distinguished from SNSs which
may add location-based elements, as the context and purpose of the system is
defined by the dependency on generating and sharing location data [146].
These services build on the work of early location-based services (LBSs),
which used self-reported locations or GSM localisation on mobile phones to
deliver simple services over standard cellular technologies such as Wireless
Application Protocol (WAP) or Short Message Service (SMS), such as recom-
mendations for nearby points of interest [133], marketers sending location-
appropriate adverts by SMS [4], or the ability to send messages to physically
co-located peers. In recent years, encouraged by the growth of the smart-
phone market, LBSs have increased in sophistication, taking advantage of the
improved location-sensing capabilities of phones equipped with GPS receiv-
ers, and the availability of higher-bandwidth cellular Internet connections to
provide richer services such as high-resolution mapping with turn-by-turn
directions and real-time road closure and traffic incident alerts, and the ability
to share one’s location with their peers via an existing SNS or one managed by
the LBS provider [129].
LBSNs involve the sharing of location data between peers. Tang et al. con-
sider such sharing to either be purpose-driven, where people choose to share
their location to achieve a utilitarian purpose such as coordinating a meeting,
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Figure2.5: Screenshot of the cashback service Quidco that incentivises checking-in with
commercial partners and sharing this with one’s social network.
or social-driven, where people choose to share their location as an act of im-
pression management, and not because the information is necessarily useful
to someone else [126]. In recent years, a number of prominent social-driven
LBSNs have emerged, such as Foursquare,3 which allows a user to “check-in”
to a place of interest they are currently visiting, and share this with their peers
on the service, or to a third-party SNS such as Facebook. As well as differ-
ent motivations for disclosures, the frequency of location-sharing often varies
between these two forms. In purpose-driven services such as Apple’s Find My
Friends, a user’s location is tracked continuously and made available to a sub-
set of peers, while social-driven services often rely on users making discrete
check-ins [142].
In recent years, the operators of LBSNs have looked for ways to make rev-
enue from their services, which are usually provided for free. As with many
other online enterprises, this has often meant incorporating advertising into
3Foursquare:http://www.foursquare.com
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their services, and the commercialisation of their users’ data. The current loc-
ation of users is a rich commodity, which had been acknowledged long before
such services became commonplace [133]. Using demographic data disclosed by
users or drawn from their online presence, advertisers are able to reach highly-
targeted groups of people when they are located in a commercially useful area.
The perceived value of such services to its users might come from the ability to
offer context-specific discounts. Some LBSNs later partnered with advertisers
to offer discounts if a user checks-in to a specific business, thus making the
user a complicit advertising agent by promoting the brand to their social net-
work for compensation. Foursquare employed a gamification element which
crowned users the “mayor” of a particular location if they checked in there the
most. In 2010, Foursquare partnered with Starbucks to offer coupons to users
who became mayor of a Starbucks outlet [118], a direct form of compensation
for users who promoted the brand to their social network. Other examples in-
clude sending text messages to people who are near a particular business [89],
and electronics retailer Radioshack’s partnering with Foursquare to offer dis-
counts to users who achieved a certain number of “badges” by checking in to a
set of locations [110]. While these developments augment existing LBSNs with
commercial elements, there have also been applications which are built around
an entirely commercial premise. Quidco4 is an online cashback provider, who
developed a mobile application where users could see a list of nearby businesses
and check-in for a small cash incentive or coupon at a retailer, or receive an
additional incentive if this check-in was shared with the user’s social network,
as shown in Figure 2.5. In addition, Quidco shares user data with its partners
when providing this service. 5 We term these new systems incentivised location
sharing services.
4Quidco: http://www.quidco.com/
5Quidco Privacy Policy: http://www.quidco.com/privacy-policy
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Privacy challenges
The ability to share one’s location builds a historic record of a person’s mo-
bility, constituting a particularly sensitive aspect of context. Over-exposure of
someone’s current or historic locations can risk revealing their home address
or mobility patterns to an unknown adversary.
Previous work has shown that the users of LBSNs primarily exhibit concern
about the context in which someone is making a request for their location,
and to a lesser extent, what the purpose of the request is [74]. Barkhuus and
Dey found that services which employed continuous tracking by other people
induced greater concern than services which detected location for the direct
delivery of a service to the user, because of the lack of perceived utility for the
person being tracked [3]. Similar concerns were articulated by participants in
a user study by Consolvo et al., where location-sharing services which allowed
others to request one’s location felt “creepy” and could affect relationships with
those making inappropriate requests [18].
As with other SNSs, the trustworthiness of LBSNs is a significant concern.
Tsai et al.’s survey of LBSNs found that a third of services did not have a privacy
policy to explain how users’ data would be processed [131], and that the major-
ity of services which did have policies retained permissions to store personally-
identifiable information (PII) indefinitely, which includes any data which can be
used to uniquely distinguish an individual [86]. The context-dependent sens-
itivity of location disclosures places great responsibility on the user to manage
the interfaces used to control who can view check-ins. The authors also noted
that while three-quarters of services expose some privacy controls, these are
often not made obvious to users.
While much of the research concerning privacy risks of LBSNs have focused
on whether the service provider can be trusted, and the social implications of
over-sharing with one’s peers, some services are explicitly designed to expose
one’s location to strangers, with potentially more damaging consequences. The
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service Grindr is popular with men who have sex with men to discover and talk
to others who are nearby. Fiebig et al. found significant security shortcomings
which allowed user profiles and social networks to be exposed by fabricating
requests to the service [29], while a report by Synack researchers found that the
exact location of users could be identified through trilateration when making
spoof requests [125]. This has implications in cultures where people may not
be able to be forthcoming about their sexual identity and could be the subject
of abuse or implicated criminally, with Toch and Levi noting that harassment
of users of such services was not uncommon [130].
Concerns with LBSNs that employ mobile advertising have been identified.
King and Jessen note that data protection regulation in the EU and US have gaps
which could lead to abuses of behavioural advertising, specifically citing the lack
of consent being sought before collecting or using personal data, surveillance
of people’s behaviour, and unwanted solicitation of commercial activity [67].
This is of particular concern considering the sensitivity of data being collected
and shared between partners. Consent is found to be an important feature in
acceptance of mobile advertising, with Scharl et al. observing that the intrus-
iveness of mobile advertising is liable to being perceived as spam if people do
not feel in control of what they receive [112]. Similarly, Xu and Teo’s theoretical
study of privacy concerns in such applications found that the perceived benefit,
particularly if the implementation of advertising was considered entertaining,
was a significant predictor of people’s acceptance of having advertisements tar-
geted to them [145].
In this section, we have introduced some instantiations of social network
sites and location-based social networks. The novelty of these services, and
the blending roles between them, has significant implications for how people
consider and use these services.
In the next section, we consider the challenges posed by attempts to research
these services from ethical and privacy perspectives.
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2.3 Studying social network sites
SNSs have become popular over a short period of time, around which a new field
of research has quickly formed. SNSs are an attractive set of technologies to ex-
amine for myriad fields. For social network analysts and graph theorists, they
provide an explicitly defined social network with no need to infer the struc-
ture, representing an advance on previous sources of social network data such
as email correspondence and phone logs [25], allowing for rich analysis of the
properties of the underlying network [132]. For social scientists, the wealth of
data held by SNS operators allows for observation of social dynamics and human
behaviour on an unprecedented scale, with the ability to target niche audiences
that might otherwise be difficult to recruit for such studies. Wilson et al. con-
ducted a comprehensive review of the range of social science research enabled
by Facebook [141]. Examples of the research that has been enabled includes
Getty et al.’s study of how people use Facebook to grieve [37] and Powell et al.’s
study of how insomnia sufferers use Twitter to discuss their condition [106].
The insights such research yield can be of high value, but perhaps due to the
relative novelty of the field, and its quick pace of development, there has been
little consideration of the implications of conducting experiments which use
data derived from SNSs, and a lack of best practices for researchers to follow.
In this section, we outline some fundamental aspects of conducting human
subjects research, and consider how these relate to the study of SNSs.
2.3.1 Research ethics
Ethics is a broad area of philosophy, attracting study across many disciplines,
and can be considered the norms for conducting one’s self to allow acceptable
and unacceptable behaviour to be detected [109].
There are two prevailing schools of thought concerning the application of
ethics to the research context, framed as either deontological or consequentialist
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in nature. The former suggests that individuals and groups have duties which
must be upheld, irrespective of the actual consequences of executing these du-
ties, and is articulated in Kant’s formulation of the Universal Law, allowing
an ethical judgement about the appropriateness of an action to be made if one
can expect all reasonable people in the same context to make the same de-
cision [62]. Conversely, consequentialist ethics holds that the appropriateness
of an action is determined by its actual impacts. This utilitarian approach to
ethics is articulated by Bentham, who suggests ethical decisions are reached
based on maximising the benefit to the greatest number of people [7].
While both approaches may reflect common ethical thinking, they have been
criticised. Hegel rejects Kantian deontological ethics by demonstrating situ-
ations in which universality cannot be reached, incorrectly judging an action
as immoral [46]. Kagan criticised consequentalist ethics for suggesting that
people would make dispassionate decisions which are likely to negatively im-
pact their immediate social network in favour of the greater number of strangers
whomay be impacted by a decision, known as the demandingness objection [60].
The Belmont Report articulates a consensus of how these ideals can be ap-
plied to the research context, identifying four principles: autonomy, benefi-
cence, non-maleficence, and justice [127]. In this thesis, we primarily consider
autonomy, which the acquisition of consent and appropriate handling of per-
sonal data aim to uphold.
Resnik argues that research ethics ensure the following are true [109]:
1. research artefacts, such as papers, do not misrepresent what the data
show, and truthfully reflect what was found.
2. collaborations can be achieved in a culture of mutual respect and trust.
3. publicly funded research can be held accountable bymandating protections
for human subjects and animals, and to avoid misconduct.
4. public support for research is maximised by highlighting the responsible
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manner in which it is conducted.
5. research promotes moral and social values by protecting human subjects,
the welfare of animals, and being socially responsible.
In this thesis, we are particularly concerned with final objective, as we con-
sider the wider social ramifications of SNS research which does not uphold ap-
propriate ethical norms.
Funding agencies and professional bodies have provided guidance on how to
ethically conduct research, which collectively forms the norms against which
the conduct of research can be assessed. The Association of Internet Research-
ers provide a comprehensive process for considering and addressing ethical is-
sues in online research [84] which provides more relevant guidance than policy
which is optimised for printed materials and face-to-face interventions. These
guidelines include some consideration of challenges in SNS research, such as
the ability to reidentify participants by combining data from multiple SNSs, but
does not specifically address the issues posed by SNSs. Next, we consider the
protections and mechanisms which aim to support ethical research, and their
applicability to the SNS domain.
2.3.2 Human subjects research
Walther defines human subjects research as:
“That in which there is any intervention or interaction with an-
other person for the purpose of gathering information, or in which
information is recorded by the researcher in such a way that a person
can be identified directly or indirectly with it.” [135]
Until the late 1940s, there was little attention paid to the ethical conduct
of human subjects research. The conduct of experiments on prisoners of war
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and civilians during the Nazi regime in the Second World War, and subsequent
Nuremberg trials, led to the formulation of a ten-point code which could be
used to identify legitimate medical research [8]. While not immediately ad-
opted, it led to international discussion on how to appropriately address the
newly-acknowledged issue of research ethics. The inconsistent application of
the Nuremberg Code by individual countries, and perceived restrictions on re-
search by its absolute requirement for informed consent [6], led to the De-
claration of Helsinki as an expression of international consensus regarding re-
search ethics, acknowledging instances in which consent may not be neces-
sary, or feasible to acquire, and permitting the use of proxies to make consent
decisions [144]. As a result, most research institutions, and even some legis-
latures, have mandated ethical requirements for conducting human subjects
research, administered by what are generally known as ethics committees or
institutional review boards (IRB). These requirements were originally designed
to ensure that subjects of biomedical research were sufficiently protected, and
to act as a liability shield for institutions. Over time, the role of IRBs increased
in scope, becoming enshrined in law, with IRB oversight required to secure fed-
eral funding for such research in the United States. Also, IRBs routinely began
to monitor a wider range of human subjects research, including social sciences,
legal studies, and the humanities [64]. Despite this evolution in purpose, how-
ever, IRB remains optimised towards conducting biomedical research, and the
appropriateness of the ethical instruments it prescribes for certain kinds of re-
search is unclear, with some information and communications technology (ICT)
researchers considering IRB oversight to be an irrelevant hindrance, with overly
bureaucratic procedures [120].
There is fundamental disagreement about whether Internet research, in-
cluding the study of SNSs, can be considered human subjects research. As
IRBs only scrutinise such studies, the distinction is important. Many online
studies involve a researcher intervening in a participant’s context, or observing
their behaviour remotely, and the layers of abstraction presented by computer-
mediated research can make the distinction less clear. McKee and Porter’s ex-
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amination of the decision charts used to determine whether a study is eligible
for IRB scrutiny found they have ambiguous applicability to many forms of
online research, raising concerns about the dehumanising effects this fram-
ing can have when conducting research online [87]. Solberg argues that data
mining from SNSs is low-risk as the Internet is a public space and Facebook
users have limited expectations of privacy. As a result, she suggests that this
should not bes considered human subjects research and exempt from further
scrutiny [116]. McKee and Porter contend, however, that even without direct in-
tervention between researchers and participants, researchers will feel a greater
sense of obligation to participants when considering the artefacts of research as
coming from human participants, and not just mining digital texts. They argue
that having material published on the Web should not be considered explicitly
public in the way that a printed publication might, and that such policies do not
sufficiently capture the nuances of online publishing [87].
2.3.3 Informed consent
The Nuremberg Code encoded the importance of consent in research studies.
Subsequently, the importance of consent being informed has been adopted by
the research community, which the Council for International Organisations of
Medical Sciences defines as:
“A decision to participate in research, taken by a competent in-
dividual who has received the necessary information; who has ad-
equately understood the information; and who, after considering the
information, has arrived at a decision without having been subjected
to coercion, undue influence or inducement, or intimidation.” [20]
The European Union’s Data Protection Directive defines that in any data pro-
cessing context, consent means:
“...any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes
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by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data
relating to him being processed.” [28]
Friedman et al. propose a model for acquiring informed consent online,
consisting of five components [33]:
1. Disclosure: Providing information about the potential benefits and harms
of participating in research.
2. Comprehension: Determining that the participant understands what is be-
ing disclosed, perhaps by restating it in their own words, or being given
the opportunity to ask questions of the researcher.
3. Voluntariness: Ensuring that participation has not been coerced.
4. Competence: Ensuring the participant has the emotional, mental, and phys-
ical faculties to give informed consent.
5. Agreement: Providing an explicit opportunity to accept or decline to take
part.
We can consider the acquisition of consent to broadly take two forms: se-
cured, and sustained, as defined by Luger and Rodden [80]. Secured consentmight
take the form of a single checkbox asking someone to agree to the terms of
participation, such as in an end-user license agreement (EULA). In an experi-
mental context, this might mean potential participants provide consent at the
beginning of the study to the collection and processing of data, while removed
from the context of the actual data collection. As the language used in such
forms is often beyond what a literate adult can understand, it is not clear that
securing consent in this fashion ensures the consent is meaningful [79]. While
this approach is trivial for participants to complete, it risks violating their pri-
vacy if data are collected and processed in a way they did not expect. At the
other extreme, we consider sustained consent, where participants are continu-
ously probed about their willingness to share discrete pieces of data over the
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course of an experiment, characterised by studies such as Sleeper et al.’s [115]
examination of self-censorship on Facebook, where participants chose when to
share information with researchers over a period of time. This approach has
the advantage of directly gaining consent in the context of the data collection,
meaning participants are better placed to make an informed decision about in-
dividual disclosures, rather than sanctioning a wider, less well defined period of
data collection. This comes at a cost, with participants required to spend longer
making consent decisions, which may prove frustrating and contribute to attri-
tion, which is a common challenge in experience-sampling experiments [47].
As with the ambiguity of whether studying SNSs constitutes human subjects
research, the applicability of informed consent to the study of SNSs is conten-
tious. Neuhaus and Webmoor suggest that obtaining informed consent when
conducting large-scale SNS studies, which may involve hundreds of thousands
of participants, is impractical, and that simply importing ethical practices from
the “offline” world is impractical [98].
2.3.4 Ethics controversies in recent SNS research
The ethical issues associated with SNS research have been highlighted by two
studies which have attracted debate.
In 2008, researchers at Harvard University released a dataset of ostensibly
anonymised Facebook profiles from a cohort of undergraduate students, named
“Tastes, Ties and Time” (T3). As explained by Zimmer, based on the inform-
ation provided by the researchers to aid analysis of the dataset, it was possible
to infer the college the dataset was derived from, and as some attributes were
only represented by a single student, it was likely that individuals could be
identified [147]. It is important to note that in this case, the researchers made
good faith attempts to protect the identity of the members of their dataset,
without appreciating the susceptibility of the data to trivial reidentification at-
tacks. In addition, their data collection was approved by their IRB, with the
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authors noting that because the researchers did not directly communicate with
the people whose data were collected, it was not a source of concern [147]. This
case highlights the limitations of the IRBmodel when those tasked with review-
ing experiment protocols are not sufficiently aware of the risks to participants
in online research. As discussed earlier, this returns to the fundamental ques-
tion of whether the subjects of remote data collection are “participants” at all,
and what responsibility researchers have to them. Zimmer concludes that the
availability of information on an SNS does not make it fair game for research-
ers [147].
In 2012, researchers at Facebook’s Data Science Team conducted a large scale
experiment on 689,003 Facebook users. The study manipulated the presenta-
tion of stories in Facebook’s News Feed product, which aggregates recent con-
tent published by a user’s social network, to determine whether biasing the
emotional content of the news feed affected the emotions people expressed in
their own disclosures [70]. The study attracted attention because of several
ethical concerns:
1. Commercial exemption from IRB As discussed earlier, academic research in
the US, andmany other countries, is subject to IRB oversight if the research
is deemed to involve human subjects. Commercial researchers, includ-
ing Facebook, have no such regulatory obligation. Although researchers
at Cornell University were co-investigators, their institution did not re-
quire IRB review because the data collection was handled exclusively by
Facebook.6 Fiske and Hauser argue that as the intent of Facebook’s study
was to contribute to “generalizable knowledge”, and not exclusively for
internal product improvement, their responsibility should equal that of
academic institutions [31].
2. Asymmetry of commercial data collection: Commercial organisations, such
as SNS providers and telecommunications operators regularly publish re-
search which has only been possible because of their ability to repurpose
6Cornell statement: http://mediarelations.cornell.edu/2014/06/30/
media-statement-on-cornell-universitys-role-in-facebook-emotional-contagion-research/
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vast amounts of internal proprietary data which no academic institutions
can likely reproduce, because the data are both unique to such organisa-
tions, and generally not made available to other researchers. This makes
studies such as Facebook’s unreproducible, meaning the academic com-
munity is unable to validate their findings. Neuhaus and Webmoor reflect
on this asymmetry from a different perspective, noting that academic re-
searchers have a greater ethical obligation, because unlike commercial op-
erators, they are not using data from people in exchange for a service which
returns benefit to the individual [98].
3. Informedconsent: As discussed earlier, acquiring informed consent is con-
sidered a key instrument when conducting human subjects research, as
mandated by IRBs. The Facebook study was conducted, however, without
participants’ knowledge. As of January 2015, Facebook’s Data Policy con-
tains a clause stating “We use all of the information we have to help us
provide and support our Services...We conduct surveys and research, test
features in development, and analyze the information we have to evalu-
ate and improve products and services, develop new products or features,
and conduct audits and troubleshooting activities.” 7 Before this, a sim-
ilar clause declared that user data was used “for internal operations, in-
cluding troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, research and service im-
provement”. Harriman and Patel argue that this clause implies research
was only for internal product development, and not for academic public-
ation [45]. The intended reach of this clause is rendered irrelevant, as at
the time the study was conducted, this policy did not include any reference
to research [49], avoiding any semblance of consent from users.
2.3.5 Reproducibility
So far, we have considered the ethical issues concerning the relationship between
researchers and the participants of SNS research. We now consider the respons-
7Facebook Data Policy: https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy
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ibility researchers have to other stakeholders including funding agencies, the
wider academic community, and the general public who benefit from and often
fund research activity. The conduct of research in a manner which satisfies
these stakeholders, and considers its ethical and sustainability impacts, is con-
sidered responsible research and innovation (RRI) [119]. An important consid-
eration is the reproducibility of experiments [128]; that a researcher ought to be
able to take a previous experiment and perform it again, or build on it to create a
new study, which is considered critical to the scientific method [26]. To ensure
reproducibility, the entire experimental workflow must be considered, from the
initial collection of data, its processing and analysis, and the dissemination of
artefacts such as research papers. Thompson and Burnett [128] suggest that
reproducibility consists of three elements:
1. Supporting computationally intensive research, by sharing source code,
tools, and workflows for executing these tools.
2. Supporting structured analysis, by encoding the scripts that conduct ana-
lyses and produce components of publications such as tables and figures.
3. Allowing the dissemination of research artefacts, such as papers, and raw
data. Rather than treating papers as a static piece of text, they should
include, or provide access to executable code, and other resources needed
for replication.
We can think of these elements as broadly encapsulating three key themes:
code, methods, and data, respectively.
There are particular challenges to conducting SNS research in a reprodu-
cible manner, some of which arise from the tension between social science and
systems-oriented approaches which manifest in much SNS work. The defini-
tion of reproducibility we use is optimised towards computational research in
which methods can be explicitly encoded, analyses automated, and results dis-
seminated. This workflow, however, is contrary to the way in which large
amounts of social science is conducted, where ethnographic approaches are
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reactive to the phenomenon being observed, and are often difficult to repro-
duce. The publication of Goffman’s ethnographic study of an underprivileged
neighbourhood in Philadelphia [39] drew attention to the challenge of valid-
ating ethnographic research because of attempts to anonymise participants,
and insufficient documentation of people’s accounts made it difficult for oth-
ers to verify the accuracy of her findings [99]. When social scientists turn to
computational methods, including the study of SNSs, the lack of an embedded
reproducibility culture can impede progress towards sharing of methodological
details. Expectations of reproducibility in different communities often relate to
the inconsistent application of terminology and their implications. Drummond
distinguishes between replicability and reproducibility, where the former aims
to completely replicate a previous experiment without deviation, while the lat-
ter means designing a unique experiment which arrives at the same result as a
previous study [27]. Again, while this realisation of reproducibility may be an
attractive ambition in many computational and physical sciences, attempting
to design an independent social science study which produces the exact same
result as a previous study is unlikely, and arguably not particularly desirable.
From these interdisciplinary disagreements, sharing of best practices between
disciplines should be encouraged, however there are SNS-specific challenges
which can make reproducibility difficult.
Most major SNSs, such as Facebook and Twitter, provide fettered access to
their data through application programming interfaces (APIs), the use of which
is subject to a license agreement. These providers assert control over how the
data that they host are used, and actively disallow large datasets of their content
to be published.8,9 This may impede the third tenet of reproducible research,
particularly when work concerns a specific corpus of content, such as Denef
et al.’s examination of tweets during the 2011 London riots [24], rather than
a random sample of content generated by a certain population. If SNS data
cannot be directly shared, then it might be possible to instead repeat the ex-
periment, but only if the sampling strategy of the original experiment can be
8Twitter Developers Terms of Service: https://dev.twitter.com/terms/api-terms
9Facebook Platform Policy: https://developers.facebook.com/policy
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replicated. This is challenging, however, when papers do not sufficiently dis-
close how their participants were recruited, and data were collected. In user
studies where users interact with SNSs, the range of variables make it diffi-
cult to replicate the participant’s experience, from the text used in prebriefing
and consent documentation, through to the implementation of user interface
elements, which can affect how people engage with the study [88].
Where research is dependent on the use of APIs provided by SNSs, there
are additional challenges to reproducibility. Code that evokes certain API en-
dpoints is dependent on that API being online and its design remaining con-
sistent, which may be an impractical expectation for actively developed services
where new features are developed and retired over time. In 2013 alone, Face-
book announced seven sets of “breaking” changes, where developers needed to
amend their code if it used certain features, incorporating the change or with-
drawal of 47 API endpoints.10 As some of these changes concern the removal of
features, some legacy code will not be usable even if actively maintained. This
is a significant challenge to reproducing results dependent on live SNS data.
More recently, Facebook has introduced an API versioning scheme which will
go some way to improving this situation, but retired API versions will only re-
ceive support for one to two years11, and such approaches are not common to
all SNSs.
Twitter provides two APIs for accessing tweets that are published in real-
time. Their “streaming” API, which is widely available, allows developers to
access a small sample of the tweets that are generated, which might be appro-
priate for visualisations of overall activity, but without the full fidelity necessary
to investigate smaller populations. A “firehose” API is made available to cer-
tain commercial partners, and provides unfettered access to the tweets being
generated 12. Morstatter et al. find that the firehose API provides a signific-
antly different sample of tweets than the streaming API [93]. These challenges
10Facebook Platform Roadmap: https://developers.facebook.com/roadmap/
completed-changes
11Facebook Platform Upgrade Guide: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apps/upgrading
12Twitter Streaming APIs: https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
31
restrict researchers’ ability to replicate studies if they are not able to collect a
similar distribution of content, depending on their license agreement with the
SNS provider. For example, De Choudhury et al. leveraged their corporate fire-
hose access to collect depression-indicative content which others might not be
able to recreate [23]. In many cases, access to the original data is not necessary.
Unlike somemore theoretical fields where reproducibility may concern the rep-
lication of results by seeding a simulation with data, or evaluating a statistical
model, many SNS papers consist of user studies which use SNSs as a conduit for
examining behaviour of a population. In such instances, replication of meth-
ods is key. For example, even subtle changes in the presentation of consent
forms can have an impact on how people interact with an experiment [88], and
even the act of asking for consent may bias results [111]. Failure to encode such
methodological details can make it difficult to accurately replicate studies and
meaningfully compare results.
The difficulty of adequately anonymising sensitive SNS data is another chal-
lenge. Anonymisation has a temporal quality - what might be sufficiently ob-
fuscated today may be deanonymised tomorrow. Narayanan and Shmatikov
demonstrate how many apparently anonymised datasets simply replace names
with random identifiers, rather than obfuscating uniquely identifying attrib-
utes, permitting re-identification [97]. Dawson surveyed 112 articles to show
participants quoted from public Web sources could trivially be reidentified [22].
Sufficiently protecting the privacy of participants after their data have been re-
leased, while maintaining their utility in further studies, is a constant tension
for SNS research.
Despite being a fundamental aspect of the scientific method, reproducibil-
ity in computational sciences has only recently been identified as a significant
issue. Stodden surveyed researchers to understand attitudes towards reprodu-
cibility [123], finding that while researchers value the benefit to the scientific
community that increased sharing of data and source code can yield, the time
taken to prepare artefacts for distribution, as well as legal and administrative
barriers, was a significant disincentive.
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2.3.6 Operationalising privacywith contextual integrity
Privacy is an ever-evolving concept with myriad, and often conflicting, defin-
itions and applications. Warren and Brandeis’ late 19th century definition of
privacy as “the right to be left alone” [137] informed substantial public de-
bate about privacy throughout the next century, in a culture where technology
risked exposing the lives of the individual to the masses. Rejecting the breadth
of this definition, Gavison defines privacy as concern for limited access to the
self: the extent to which we are known, physically accessible, or the subject of
others’ attention [35], and rejects the notion that privacy is a form of control
over information, as articulated by Westin [138].
The difficulty in arriving at a definition of privacy which is sufficiently ex-
pressive but not overly broad remains an open problem. In this thesis, we ad-
opt the principle of privacy as a form of maintaining limited access to the self,
however this is insufficent to measure the privacy impacts of a process, and to
recommend best practices to mitigate these impacts. Solove proposed a tax-
onomy of privacy which models the relationship between the data subject and
data holders, and the role of information collection, processing, dissemination,
and potential invasion [117]. Solove’s framework is intended to help broaden the
understanding of privacy violations and their impacts, but is not comprehens-
ive enough to identify and mitigate issues in individual processes. We therefore
assess the applicability of a conceptual framework for identifying and resolving
privacy breaches. Our focus in studying SNSs is to consider the ethical and pri-
vacy implications of the study of such systems, as well as the issues associated
with the design of the systems themselves. Therefore, we adopt contextual in-
tegrity, a theoretical framework proposed by Nissenbaum [100] for considering
information privacy. Avoiding the narrow definitions of her contemporaries,
Nissenbaum does not define privacy so much as propose a model for identify-
ing the source and impact of privacy violations. She argues that information is
not inherently public or private, but governed by context-specific norms, which
determine to whom it is appropriate for information to be transmitted to, and
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for what purpose. Individuals, organisations, and sections of society each have
their expectations about what constitutes the appropriate flow of information,
and any actor can perceive a privacy violation if these expectations are not met.
For example, in order to receive a diagnosis for a medical condition, a patient
accepts that they must communicate sensitive information about their health
to a doctor. The information might generally be considered “private”, but both
actors have an understanding of the norms governing this sharing of inform-
ation, and thus there is no privacy violation. If, however, that doctor was to
subsequently gossip about this condition to someone else, the expectations of
the patient have been violated, and so has their privacy.
Self-reported scales are often used to capture people’s qualitiative concern
about information-sharing practices. Westin’s privacy indexes have been used
in a number of studies [72] to show emerging concerns in domains such as
consumer and medical privacy, since the early 1990s. Concern about the rise
of direct marketing and, later, online information collection, led to the de-
velopment of domain-specific models such as the Internet Users’ Information
Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale [82]. These scales are attractive because they
provide a means of operationalising an inherently difficult concept such as pri-
vacy. In this thesis, however, we choose to adopt contextual integrity as our
model for studying privacy issues rather than some of these extensively stud-
ied and validated scales, as they are focused on the individual’s perception of
privacy violation, which can be difficult to assess where information collection
and processing is unseen or too complex for laypeople to articulate. In addition,
these scales are not sufficient for identifying the source of a privacy breach, or
the wider societal impacts of these practices. As such, contextual integrity’s at-
traction is that it provides a vocabulary for examining and mitigating the issues
with emerging systems.
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Decision heuristic
To aid the analysis of information-sharing practices with contextual integrity,
Nissenbaum provides a nine-step “decision heuristic” to analyse the signific-
ant points of departure created by a new process, thus determining if the new
practice represents a potential violation of privacy. The first six steps involve
modelling the existing and new contexts, allowing a prima facie judgement to
be rendered as to whether the new process significantly violates the entrenched
norms of the context. The final steps of the heuristic involve a wider examin-
ation of the moral and political implications of the process to make a recom-
mendation as to whether the new practice should be adopted. These steps are
as follows:
1. Describe the new practice in terms of its information flows.
2. Identify the prevailing context in which the practice takes place, which
should be suitably broad such that the impacts of any nested contexts can
be considered.
3. Identify the subjects, senders, and recipients of information.
4. Identify the transmission principles: the conditions under which inform-
ation ought (or ought not) to be shared between parties. These might
be social or regulatory constraints, such as the expectation of reciprocity
when friends share news, or the obligation for someone with a duty of care
to report when their ward is in danger.
5. Identify any applicable entrenched informational norms in the context,
and identify any points of departure the new practice introduces.
6. Making a prima facie assessment: there may be a violation if there are
discrepancies in these parameters, or if there are incomplete normative
structures in the context to support the new practice.
7. Consider the moral and political factors affected by the new practice. Could
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it affect people’s freedom or autonomy, impact on power structures, justice,
or the execution of democracy?
8. How does the new practice affect the goals or values of the prevailing con-
text? If there were any implications identified in the previous step, how
do they effect the goals of this context?
9. Finally, make a determination as to whether the new process violates con-
textual integrity based on a consideration of these wider factors.
As a diagnostic tool, the decision heuristic further supports our decision to
study privacy with contextual integrity, as it provides a consistent mechanism
for assessing the impacts of an emerging process, which consumer-focused
privacy scales do not extend to.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced the range of social network sites that we
will consider in the remainder of this thesis, and discussed the ethical issues
associated with conducting research of such systems. We note the following:
• SNSs use knowledge of the relationships between people to deliver socially-
appropriate services over the Internet.
• SNSs such as Facebook and LBSNs such as Foursquare are becoming in-
creasingly popular with people; however each raises serious privacy im-
plications.
• The increasing popularity of such services is encouraging research into
how they are used, and how they can be improved, but such research is
fraught with a number of ethical and methodological challenges.
In the next chapter, we consider recent research that aims to tackle the issues
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with SNSs we identified, and examine proposed solutions to the methodological
issues with researching such systems.
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Chapter 3
State of the art
In this chapter, we explore recent research that attempts to resolve the pri-
vacy challenges we identified earlier with several forms of social network sites
(SNSs). We also survey the SNS literature to determine the extent to which
work in this domain tackles the issues of ethics and reproducibility discussed
in Chapter 2.
3.1 Resolvingprivacychallenges in location-basedso-
cial networks
In Chapter 2.2 we outlined a number of privacy challenges identified in the
literature concerning LBSNs. In this section, we discuss recent efforts to resolve
these issues and identify open problems.
We noted that the context and purpose of requests for location data was a
significant predictor of concern, whether from a peer, or a third party such
as the LBSN provider or an advertiser. Hoyle et al. propose using feedback
about attempts to access data to mitigate such concerns. Their system changes
the apparel of an avatar representing the user to illustrate how contextually
inappropriate their exposure is [50]. Such an abstraction allows for a quick
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comprehension of how exposed someone’s context is, but does not include detail
of discrete requests, which may limit someone’s ability to judge the suitability
of these requests.
The availability and ease-of-use of mechanisms to allow users to control
who has access to their data was identified as an issue. Knijnenburg et al.
find that simply providing more fine-grained controls does not lead to better
privacy decisions, and note that application designers should consider the tan-
gible privacy and benefit trade-offs each option represents [68]. Finnis et al.
propose a policy-specification language that could be used to mitigate differ-
ences between services. Allowing applications to declare when location data are
needed and at what precision allows restrictions on their capabilities to be en-
forced and communicated to users, who are otherwise given coarse controls for
the permissions of applications [30]. Their work does not examine, however,
whether users can comprehend the constraints the policy language enables and
make informed decisions about the suitability of applications. Christin et al.
propose “privacy bubbles” as location-specific spheres where only those within
the bubble can access the content generated within it [16]. Such an approach
tackles some of the usability challenges issues with ad-hoc sharing in colocated
environments, such as allowing a group of tourists to share photos without
granting each other permanent access to each others’ content. This also makes
important contributions towards exposing these settings in an easy to compre-
hend manner, but it is left to further work to determine whether such a meta-
phor would be appropriate for other types of sharing. Kapadia et al. propose
“virtual walls” as a system for controlling access to contextual information,
such as location, in pervasive sensing environments [63], using a metaphor of
walls of differing transparency to communicate the types of information that
can be exposed. While they found that the metaphor can be understood, its
applicability in the wild has not yet been demonstrated.
As we introduced in Chapter 2.2, incentivised location sharing augments
traditional LBSNs with the addition of financial incentives, and the sharing of
personal information with third party merchants. This can compound con-
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cerns with the trustworthiness of LBSNs. Moniruzzaman and Barker developed
a form of ILS that requires users to check-in to a participating business a certain
number of times before receiving an incentive. As disclosing an entire check-
in history to a merchant in order to validate whether a deal should be offered
could risk the privacy of users, their framework minimises the amount of in-
formation transmitted to merchants. The framework also employs a recom-
mendation engine to suggest to users at what interval they should check-in to
minimise the chance of mobility patterns being inferred by an adversary [90].
While such an approach resolves some of the risks to users when disclosing
their location, it places responsibility on the end-user to take advantage of the
system to maximise their benefit, and does not address the underlying issues
with allowing users to control the use of their information in an ILS application.
Kahl et al. proposed a privacy-preserving architecture for mobile advertising
that used the provider of an SNS as a middleman for matching adverts to relev-
ant groups of users, based on contextual knowledge of the users, and without
transmitting data about individual users to advertisers [61]. As well as support-
ing the traditional business-to-consumer (B2C) advertising paradigm, the ar-
chitecture also considered a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) model used in viral
advertising campaigns, where one person advertises to their social network.
While the framework considers how influential members of a social network
could be identified with a hope to spreading the advertising message, and notes
that such peers would likely need to be given an incentive to do so, this work
does not directly consider the implications of incentivising such C2C advertising
activity. Haddadi et al. propose a mobile advertising system in which determ-
ining the appropriateness of adverts to an individual user is performed on the
user’s own device, and does not rely on a middle-man with understanding of
the users, unlike Kahl et al.’s model [44]. The system distributes adverts to
users through cellular multicast protocols or from 802.11 hotspots, and lever-
ages delay-tolerant networks to anonymously report engagement statistics for
ads, adding additional layers of protection to users. Again, while the authors do
consider that incentives would likely be needed to encourage adoption of such
a system, consideration of their impacts was beyond the scope of their work.
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The potential for sensitive location data to be intercepted by an adversary
has drawn attention to the need to protect the privacy of location information,
particularly when the LBSN operator, or a third-party merchant, is not trusted.
Such informationmust be preserved while maintaining the utility of the service.
Skvortsov at al. propose a system in which individual operators are sent low-
precision location data, fusing the traces given to different services to allow
individual operators to use higher-precision data [114]. While this is robust to
a number of attacks, both external, and by an untrustworthy LBSN provider, it
would need to be coupled with a usable model for controlling the rights given
to each operator, which may be too abstract for end-users and divorced from
the utility of such services.
In this section, we have outlined solutions to some of the privacy challenges
with LBSNs. We note there are many strategies that aim to secure the transmis-
sion of location data when the provider of an LBSN, or other peers in the service,
cannot be trusted. New interfaces which abstract users from the complexity of
configuring privacy policies, and visualisations of how their information are
being accessed, attempt to mitigate some of the concerns about how to control
access to information, and feel more comfortable that the context of requests is
appropriate. There has also been some consideration of how to manage the ad-
dition of commercial entities to the equation, mostly from trust perspectives.
There are, however, open questions not yet resolved by the literature. When
commercial actors are involved, do people comprehend the flows of informa-
tion involved? Are they able to make informed decisions about what should be
shared with whom, based on this understanding? As the addition of incentives
to these services is still relatively novel, there has been little consideration of
the privacy and usability impacts they represent. Later in this thesis, we will
tackle these outstanding issues.
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3.2 Informed consent
In Chapter 2.3.3 we outlined some of the issues with acquiring consent in SNS
studies. In this section, we discuss recent approaches towards consent, and
consider their appropriateness to SNS research.
As discussed earlier, informed consent is rooted in biomedical research, and
it is in this domain that most recent discourse is centred. In the collection of
samples for biobanks, consent has traditionally been considered broad, where
donors give consent to their samples being used in future research within an
agreed framework [122]. This is distinct from most SNS studies we consider to
be self-contained, where a participant consents to an individual study, where
data are collected or generated, and the participation ends. While similar to
our notion of secured consent, it is not strictly analogous, as donors are ex-
pected to give consent again if any aspect of the framework changes. Kaye
et al. suggest that this is insufficient, as it is too open-ended to allow donors
to make informed decisions about what might happen to their samples in the
future. They propose dynamic consent [65] as a solution to this, applicable to
domains beyond biobanking. This approach is designed to engage participants
in research over time, using the Internet to let them see how their samples
have been used, to receive requests for consent for new studies and to request
additional information and give consent, with the participant determining the
extent to which they engage in the process. We consider this a manifestation
of sustained consent, as it does not rely on consent sought at a single point in
time. Despite its grounding in biomedical research, it is likely applicable to SNS
studies. For studies where data are collected over a period of time, a dynamic
approach to consent that considers the changing contexts in which the data are
collected and the participant’s wishes in those contexts might be more appro-
priate. In addition, researchers who wish to share datasets collected from SNSs
with others could employ dynamic consent to determine whether participants
sanction individual studies, and to give feedback about how their data are used.
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Luger and Rodden discuss how such an approach might be applicable to ubi-
quitous computing, where devices are continuously tracking, processing, and
sharing sensor data about people and their environment. They argue that con-
sent needs to be sensitive to the context in which data are collected, and evolve
beyond simply notifying people of data collection, and instead meaningfully
inform them of how and why their data are being used over time [80]. Mor-
rison et al. demonstrate how this could be adopted in mobile experiments, by
presenting feedback to users about what data have been collected. Their finding
that visualisation of these data increases the attrition rate in such studies raises
the question of whether these participants would have declined to participate
had they understood the implications of a study that employed a secured ap-
proach to consent [92]. Munteanu et al. advocate a “situational” approach to
ethics in HCI research, arguing that “static” ethical approval is detached from
the realities of conducting ethnographic studies in the field, and that traditional
consent instruments can be difficult to administer in practice, particularly when
working with vulnerable people. They recommend involving HCI practitioners
in the creation of ethics policy, and allowing flexibility in ethics protocols to
adapt to the research context as it unfolds [95]. Similarly, Neuhaus and Web-
moor propose “agile ethics”, arguing acquiring traditional forms of informed
consent is not practical when conducting large scale experiments using SNSs.
Informed by agile software engineering techniques, they suggest that consid-
eration of ethics should be ongoing, and rooted in an understanding of all actors
involved, rather than focusing on up-front documentation and fixed IRB proto-
cols. They argue that an approach that considers the realities of data collection
can mitigate the lack of consent acquisition and lead to more responsible re-
search [98].
Steinsbekk et al. argue that a dynamic approach to consent is not neces-
sary, because it burdens participants with the need to sanction each additional
research project, even if there is no significant ethical departure, and transfers
ethical responsibility from IRBs to individual participants, which reduces ethical
oversight [122]. Friedman et al. also caution that overwhelming participants
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with information and consent interventions can have the counter-productive
result of disengaging participants and numbing them to the process [34]. In
focus groups with medical researchers, Whitley et al. find concerns about the
logistical burden of providing a framework for revoking consent, both in terms
of the time and cost in administrating it, and the difficulty in planning trials
when higher attrition might be likely [139]. Gomer et al. propose using a semi-
automated agent to make consent decisions on behalf of a user to reduce the
burden placed on individuals. These decisions are informed by preferences ex-
pressed by the user, and refined through periodic review [41]. Similarly, Moran
et al. consider how to negotiate consent in multi-agent environments, sug-
gesting that identifying interaction patterns can gain insight into appropriate
moments to acquire consent [91].
From this tension, we can identify two spectra on which consent can be
measured: accuracy and burden. That is to say, does the consent instrument
capture the willingness of the participant to have their data used in a particular
context, and how much time is spent and cognitive load placed on the par-
ticipant to acquire consent? Kaye et al. argue that broad consent minimises
burden at the cost of accuracy, while dynamic consent maximises accuracy at
the cost of burden. Conversely, Steinsbekk et al. suggest that broad consent
minimises burden while achieving acceptable accuracy, while dynamic consent
substantially increases burden with no demonstrable improvement to accuracy.
Without any quantitative measurement of the interaction between these two
variables, it is difficult to determine what form of consent is most appropriate
to SNS studies. Attempting to formalise understanding of this remains an open
problem.
3.3 Reproducibility in SNS research
In Chapter 2.3.5, we noted that reproducibility consists of three elements, which
relate to the capture and sharing of code, methods, and data. In this section,
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we discuss the state of the art in addressing these issues, and consider the
applicability of these methods to the study of online social networks.
There are increasing efforts towards supporting the sharing of source code
and data. One such example is the data-sharing repository FigShare1, which
allows researchers to upload research artefacts and generate digital object iden-
tifiers (DOIs), which allow such artefacts to be cited by others. Gent proposes a
recomputation framework that allows legacy experimental code to be executed
in the future by encapsulating the environment needed to execute it in a vir-
tual machine image [36]. Such an approach is optimised towards experiments
that are inherently recomputable, such as simulations, but its applicability to
human subjects research, such as that involving SNSs, is unclear, where rep-
lications may depend on the availability of external services, and participants
to provide new data.
Another area of interest is to encode the workflow of an experiment. This
speaks to the second pillar of reproducibility: encapsulating the methodology
of a study. Domain-specific tools for workflow capture have been proposed,
but due to the specific challenges found in each field, these are not universally
applicable, or appropriate for SNS research. The development of standards for
sharing domain-specific data allows researchers to collaborate on shared prob-
lems For example, biologists have developed standards for representing pro-
teomics data, such as the protein sequence database UniProt [57]. There are
ongoing attempts by the W3C’s Social Web Working Group to define standards
to encourage interoperability between SNSs, but it remains to be seen whether
such efforts will also benefit SNS researchers.2 The development of appropri-
ate standards enables the encoding and sharing of workflows, where there are
domain-specific solutions. VisTrails is a system for encoding workflows, to al-
low the reconstruction of visualisations and plots from the original data [32].
Sumatra couples the execution of experiments with revisions in a version con-
trol system to allow the environment of a particular execution to be recreated
1FigShare: http://figshare.com/
2W3C Social Web Working Group Charter: http://www.w3.org/2013/socialweb/
social-wg-charter
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later [21]. There are domain-specific tools to support the execution of work-
flows, such as in biology, which has an embedded culture of sharing proto-
cols such that other researchers can re-use and adapt these protocols in their
own experiments. One such initiative is Taverna, which allows workflows that
rely on several Web services and tools to be combined into a pipeline [143].
These workflows can be shared with others using repositories such as myEx-
periment, which adopts an SNS-like approach to sharing [38]. Such efforts have
been found to support the building of social capital within the research com-
munity, with workflow-sharing perceived as a reputation-building exercise.
When adopting the system, though, researchers found limitations with repro-
ducing workflows “off-the-shelf”, due to poor annotation and documentation
of many workflows [107].
We are not aware of any solutions that aim to deal with the specific chal-
lenges of SNS research we identified in Chapter 2.3.5. The approaches we have
discussed so far do not consider the sustainability challenge of reproducing ex-
periments that may depend on APIs that have changed, or SNSs that no longer
operate. These approaches are not optimised for human subjects research, with
no consideration of how to encode the participant sampling strategy, the brief-
ing and consent materials they were presented with, or the ethical and privacy-
preserving handling of sensitive SNS data.
Noting the increased attention reproducibility has attracted across a range
of disciplines, but considering the lack of tools to support the reproducibility
of SNS research, we are interested in the extent to which the issue has been
addressed in the SNS literature. To do so, we survey research papers that have
recently used data from SNSs such as Facebook or Twitter.
Our survey of the SNS literature is not the first. Mullarkey developed a typo-
logy of SNS papers based on a sample of papers, to illustrate biases in the nature
of SNS research [94]. Wilson et al. [141] look at 412 papers that use Facebook,
to examine how Facebook has been used by social scientists. Caers et al. [13]
find 3,068 papers in a broader search to identify the themes of such research,
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but neither focuses on the reproducibility of SNS research. Golders and Macy
conduct a wide-ranging survey of SNS research in sociology [40], and outline
privacy as a research challenge, but not ethics, and discuss methodology but in
the context of training sociologists in methods for collecting SNS data. Alim
surveys SNS researchers about ethics concerns, and finds that 25% of respond-
ents sought ethics approval for their studies [2], however there might be an
element of selection bias, since researchers more interested in ethics might
have responded to this particular survey.
To determine the state of reproducibility in the field, we examine 901 pa-
pers from 26 venues, published between 2011 and 2013. A range of venues were
included to gain a diverse range of perspectives, including top-tier HCI confer-
ences, network science workshops, and social science journals. We first col-
lected all papers that satisfied the search terms shown in Table 3.1. For each
paper, we then assessed whether the paper involved the handling of SNS data.
If a paper’s methodology concerned the collection or publication of data inten-
ded for an SNS, whether already established (such as Facebook or Twitter), or
developed as a testbed for academic study, it was included. This was the case
whether the authors directly processed the data themselves, or a previously
crawled dataset was utilised.
Of the 901 papers examined, 505 met this criteria and were then tested
against ten criteria we devised for assessing reproducibility, which we outline
in Chapter 3.3.1.
To better understand trends across the literature, we categorised venues in
one of two ways. Journals and magazines were grouped by field, using the pub-
lication’s top category as listed by Thomson Reuters3, while conferences were
grouped by the best-fitting top-level category in the ACM Computing Classific-
ation System.4 A summary of the venues, their classifications, and the number
of papers examined is shown in Table 3.2. Finally, for each paper included in
3Thomson Reuters’ Journal Citation Reports: http://thomsonreuters.com/
journal-citation-reports
4ACM CCS: http://dl.acm.org/ccs.cfm
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Field Keywords
Abstract contains any of Facebook
Twitter
Foursquare
LinkedIn
Friendster
Weibo
Flickr
LiveJournal
MySpace
“Online social network”
“Social network site”
“Social networking site”
SNS
OSN
Publication date between 01-01-2011
31-12-2013
Table 3.1: The semantics of the search term used to identify papers in the study (the
exact syntax for expressing the search varied from source to source).
the survey, we conducted a citation analysis by querying Google Scholar to re-
ceive a citation count for each paper on July 8th 2014. While Google Scholar
may not provide an exhaustive count of all citations, it allows us to study the
relative performance of the papers we examine, in a similar fashion to other
studies [105].
3.3.1 Explanation of criteria
Each of the 505 papers was tested against the following set of criteria. These
align with the three aspects of reproducibility outlined earlier. For each cri-
terion, a paper is assigned a binary flag to indicate satisfaction. This was de-
termined by a manual reading of the papers, and not the result of an automated
content analysis process.
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Venue type Venue Total Relevant
Computer science IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing
2 1
Computing Networks 7 4
Communications of the
ACM
46 2
Computer
Communications
9 5
IEEE Pervasive Computing 2 1
Security & Privacy NDSS 2 1
SOUPS 9 2
S&P 3 1
CCS 13 1
WPES 4 2
Information systems COSN 14 12
EuroSys SNS 13 7
WOSN 9 7
WebSci 40 33
ICWSM 200 177
ASONAM 155 120
HotSocial 9 6
Human-centered
computing
CHI 82 39
CSCW 73 45
Pervasive 9 0
UbiComp 23 9
Multidisciplinary Nature 10 3
Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences
7 4
Science 7 2
Communication Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication
18 3
Psychology Computers in
Human Behaviour
129 13
Anthropology Social Networks 6 5
Total 901 505
Table 3.2: Breakdown of the surveyed papers by venue. The “total” column indicates
howmany papers matched our search term, while the “relevant” column indicates how
many used OSN data, meriting further study.
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Methods
1. Source SNS: User behaviour is not identical across social network sites, so
replications are dependent on knowing where data were collected, either
to collect data from a similar population, or to show differences between
SNSs. Thus we note whether the paper explicitly identify the SNS(s) from
which data were collected or published to. If the authors note that data
were collected from an SNS aggregation service such as FriendFeed5without
clarifying which underlying SNSs were accessed, this criterion is not met.
2. Sampling strategy: Just as the choice of underlying SNS may indicate biases
in the resulting data, the way participants in the research were chosen is
an important consideration. When conducting user studies, it is important
to know whether the authors were investigating a certain population, or
whether they intend their findings to be generally applicable to a wider
population, as this has implications for how participants are recruited for
replications. Similarly, large-scale crawling exercises may be biased if, for
example, user IDs are collected in increments from an arbitrary starting
point. To satisfy this criterion, the paper must explain how participants
were recruited, either explaining the sampling technique, or offering a
breakdown of the participants’ demographics. If the study used an existing
dataset, the authors must explain how the underlying data were collected.
3. Length of study: As discussed in Chapter 2.1, SNSs exhibit a number of
temporal effects, with the design of systems continuously evolving, and
people’s behaviours and attitude towards their data evolving. Accordingly,
in order to replicate SNS studies, it is important to know the length of
time over which data were collected, as this can affect user behaviour,
and ideally at what time data were collected. To satisfy this criterion, the
period of data collection must be identified.
4. Numberofparticipants: As the number of participants will affect the num-
ber of results, and the effect size of analyses, it is important to disclose
5FriendFeed: http://friendfeed.com
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how many were collected. To satisfy this criterion, the number of par-
ticipants, or users whose data were crawled, must be identified. In user
studies, if participants were in one of many experimental conditions, the
distribution of participants among these conditions must be disclosed.
5. Data processing: Understanding how data are handled throughout an ex-
periment is an important detail, from both reproducibility and ethical per-
spectives. Knowing precisely which attributes of sensitive SNS data were
collected is important to both replicate the study, and ensure data collec-
tion is proportionate to requirements, especially as SNS APIs make it trivial
to collect significant amounts of information. In addition, knowledge of
how data were sanitised is important, particularly when releasing data that
relates to sensitive SNS content. For example, have identifying character-
istics been anonymised or aggregated, and how? To satisfy this criterion,
the paper must have answered at least one of the following questions: Is
the data handling strategy identified? Are the attributes of collected data
enumerated? Were the data sanitised? How were they stored? Who had
access to the data?
6. Consent: As discussed in Chapter 2.3.3, the issue of obtaining informed
consent when conducting online research is contentious. Depending on its
nature, SNS research may constitute human subjects research, in which
case data-handling practices should be subject to the participants’ in-
formed consent. Understanding whether consent was sought is important
for replications, as the process may have implications on the results. To
satisfy this criterion, the authors must note whether the human subjects
of the data collection provided consent to participate. The authors do not
need to have sought consent to satisfy this criterion, but the issue must
have been considered in the text.
7. Participant brieﬁng: As with the acquisition of consent, the briefing and
debriefing experience is an important ethical consideration when conduct-
ing human subjects research. These procedures ought to be explained in
the text such that other studies can replicate the procedures for the most
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consistent participant experience. To satisfy this criterion, the paper must
disclose whether participants were briefed and debriefed to bookend their
participation in the study.
8. IRB/Ethics: Alongside disclosure of consent and briefing procedures, stud-
ies should disclose whether the procedures of an experiment were ap-
proved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB), ethics committee, or equi-
valent. The need for such approval is dependent on what certain institu-
tions or jurisdictions deem to be human subjects research, but disclosure
can support replications, as IRB oversight may affect the ultimate data
collection protocol of an experiment. To satisfy this criterion, the authors
must note whether such bodies have approved the practices of the study.
Data
9. Data shared: The studies we examine may concern first-hand collection of
data, perhaps by crawling an SNS, or conducting a user study to exam-
ine behaviour in an SNS. Alternatively, studies may use existing datasets,
either provided through arrangement through a third-party, or by using
a public dataset. Data sharing is acknowledged as an important aspect
of reproducibility, but for all SNS research it is not essential, particularly
where the data collection practices are sufficiently explained to allow other
researchers to collect their own data. Nonetheless, we consider for each
paper whether the data are shared with the research community, or if the
authors explicitly entertain requests for access to the data. Where an ex-
isting dataset is used, the authors must explicitly cite it.
Code
10. Protocol: Another pillar of reproducibility concerns access to software arte-
facts necessary for collecting data, conducting analysis, and generating
outputs such as plots. If a study concerns a bespoke visualisation, or the
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Psychology (13)
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Multidisciplinary (9)
Human−centered computing (93)
Information systems (362)
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Computer science (16)
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Figure 3.1:Heatmap showing how different fields achieve our three criteria types. Data-
sharing is particularly poor across most disciplines, while reporting of methodologies
is generally stronger.
development of a new SNS or alternative SNS interface, these should be ac-
cessible openly, and ideally the source should be available for others to use.
To satisfy this criterion we check whether authors who develop their own
software make this available to other researchers, and whether statistical
analyses are explained in such a way that they can be replicated.
Our survey highlights differences in how well papers in different venues
achieve reproducibility. Figure 3.1 shows a high-level summary of how differ-
ent fields satisfy the three criteria types we introduced in Chapter 3.3.1.
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Figure 3.2: Heatmap showing how well each type of venue achieve our three criteria
types. Data-sharing and methodology reporting are similar, however conferences and
magazines are better at sharing code.
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3.3.2 Few SNS researchers share their data
The most striking finding is that few papers share their data at all, with only
6.1% of papers in our survey doing so. Unsurprisingly, this is closely associated
with the data-sharing policies of different venues. Multidisciplinary journals
such as Nature and Science mandate authors to include data such that reviewers
and other researchers can replicate results,6 7and accordingly are a notable ex-
ception to this trend, with 40% of papers sharing their data. We are not aware
of any conferences in our survey that mandate data necessary for replication
must be shared, although conferences such as SOUPS do allow authors to in-
clude appendices that support replication.8 Similarly, the ICWSM conference
operates a data sharing initiative to encourage the sharing of datasets,9 that
may explain why 35.4% of the papers that shared data came from this venue.
We note that papers at some information systems venues, such as EuroSys SNS
and COSN, are moderately better at their data sharing practices, with authors
at both sharing data twice as often as the venue average. This appears to be a
side-effect of many papers using crawled social graphs, rather than datasets of
content, such as tweets, that are licensed under terms which prohibit redistri-
bution. As shown in Figure 3.2, papers in venues of all types are quite poor at
routinely sharing their data. Journals fare better with 13.9% of papers sharing
their data; however a chi-square test of independence does not suggest this is
a significantly greater effect than other venue types (x2 = 4.38, df = 2, p = 0.11).
3.3.3 Social scientistsrarelysharecodeforexperimentsandana-
lyses
We find that code-sharing practices are generally better, which includes the
distribution of theorems or algorithms that support replication, but notably no
6Nature data policy: http://www.nature.com/authors/policies/availability.html
7Science data policy: http://www.sciencemag.org/site/feature/contribinfo/prep/gen_info.
xhtml
8SOUPS 2014 Call for Papers: http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2014/cfp.html
9ICWSM Data Sharing Initiative: http://icwsm.org/2015/datasets/datasets
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venue types, except for multidisciplinary journals, include a majority of papers
who satisfy this.
In this analysis, Computers in Human Behavior (CHB) was notable in that none
of the papers we examined shared code. CHB’s simultaneous computational and
social science focus attracts authors from diverse disciplines and may go some
way to explaining this. Of the 13 papers that we examined, first authors are
affiliated with computer science, communications, political science, manage-
ment, humanities, psychology, and law faculties. For many such fields, there
may be no expectation that quantitative methods are shared to allow replic-
ation. As multidisciplinary efforts like this gain traction, it is important that
the strengths of social sciences – such as experience with qualitative meth-
ods – feed into computer science, just as traditional CS strengths – such as
an emphasis on sharing code – are accepted by the wider computational social
sciences community.
Code-sharing rates increase dramatically between publication types. As shown
in Figure 3.2, protocols are shared in approximately a quarter of workshop and
journal papers, while 41.4% of conference papers satisfy this. In Paek and Hsu’s
work to create phrase sets for text entry experiments from large corpora, the
researchers made the phrase sets and code available, and included detailed al-
gorithmic details within the paper [103]. As noted earlier, we attribute this
trend towards sharing to more stringent requirements for supplementary ma-
terials in such publications. As workshops are often used for work in progress,
it may be that researchers are reticent to share unfinished code. We would hope
to see this change, however, to help engage the community in the development
and re-use of software even in an unfinished state.
3.3.4 Reporting of core experimental parameters is strong
Reporting of the methodological attributes appears strong across all papers;
however, the breakdown of these criteria in Figure 3.3 shows a more complex
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Figure 3.3: Breakdown of the eight criteria we assess for “methods”. Generally, papers
successfully report descriptive attributes of their study, but often, participant handling
and data processing are not sufficiently explained.
dichotomous story. The first four criteria illustrate the extent to which stud-
ies report the core aspects of their data collection practices, critical to repro-
duce any such studies, including the source SNSs, how participants and their
data were sampled, for how long data were collected, and the number of par-
ticipants. Generally, papers are very good at reporting this information, with
some notable exceptions. Just as studies that used existing datasets are inher-
ently better at sharing the data they use, they tend to be worse at reporting the
provenance of their datasets, such as the composition of the dataset’s parti-
cipant pool. These are crucial details that are required to replicate such studies,
particularly if the original dataset is not to be used – such as aiming to replicate
the findings of a user study with a different population.
3.3.5 Participant-handlingandethicalconsiderationsarenotdis-
cussed
The final four criteria in our methodology breakdown concern data processing
and participant ethics, two critical aspects of reproducibility, where consistently
most papers do not report core methodological concerns: did participants give
consent? Were procedures approved by an IRB? How were the collected data
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handled? Again we see a divide in approaches between systems papers, and
social sciences. Quantitative work, for example, is better at reporting how their
data were handled, such as anonymisation practices, and which attributes of
datasets were stored. As Figure 3.3 shows, the seven “Security and Privacy”
papers we consider are better at reporting these concerns. We attribute this
to a culture of reporting these details at SOUPS, while WPES allows appendices
with supplementary information to be provided. Conversely, the social science
background of many CHB papers is highlighted in the marginal improvement in
reporting of ethical concerns, shown in the Psychology group. We were surprised
to find that human-computer interaction (HCI) papers were not particularly
strong in this regard. Indeed, such reporting is so uncommon that attention
should be drawn to positive cases, such as Johnson et al.’s description of their
recruitment material and consent procedures [58], and Ali et al.’s reporting of
their study’s participant briefing process [1]. Simply reporting the existence of
briefing and consent procedures generally does little to support replication. Our
concern with the lack of robust description of such methods, is that as previous
work shows the briefing experience can affect people’s disclosure behaviours
in SNS experiments [88], it is important that researchers can replicate these
procedures when conducting user studies using SNS data.
In this section, we have looked at how well the state of the art addresses re-
producibility in SNS research. We find that venues from more technical back-
grounds differ in their reporting from the social sciences. While some fields
have developed domain-specific tools to capture workflows and aid with repro-
ducibility, there are none that support the SNS-specific issues we have identi-
fied.
3.4 Studying SNSswith contextual integrity
In Chapter 2.3.6, we introduced Nissenbaum’s model of contextual integrity. In
the rest of this thesis, we apply this model to the design and study of SNSs, but
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we first consider how others have applied the framework to the study of online
privacy.
Barkhuus advocates contextual integrity as a method for studying privacy in
HCI studies, arguing it provides a more useful lens for understanding people’s
privacy preferences and for detecting violations, compared to some commonly-
used methods, such as the Westin-Harris privacy scales [77], which try to cap-
ture a person’s overall level of privacy concern. Borcea-Pfitzmann et al. argue
contextual integrity should be incorporated into all assessment about the po-
tential impacts of systems, and that designers should seek to maximise the
contextual integrity of user data [9].
Grodzinsky and Tavani applied contextual integrity to cloud computing, spe-
cifically adopting the decision heuristic, discussed in Chapter 2.3.6, to determ-
ine whether the cloud-based document editing service Google Docs might vi-
olate people’s privacy [42]. Jones and Janes also apply the decision heuristic to
Google Books, highlighting its usefulness for determining whether a new tech-
nology might perturb privacy norms where this is an established context, in
this case physical libraries [59], finding that the loss of reader anonymity, and
potential for surveillance, has privacy risks.
Lipford et al. note that SNSs such as Facebook may lead to violations of
contextual integrity [75], because of the risk of context collapse, as discussed
in Chapter 2.1. Hull et al. make a similar argument, noting that violations arise
from the News Feed product and application programming interface (API), as
they often involve the repurposing of user data beyond the context in which it
was initially published [51]. Similarly, Shi et al. argue that the introduction of
“friendship pages” to Facebook, which aggregates content shared between two
peers, violates contextual integrity because the original authors of the content
would not expect it to be aggregated in this way [113].
While contextual integrity has been widely used to study a range of online
services, including SNSs, we have not observed its applicability to determin-
ing whether those conducting research on such services respect the contextual
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integrity of their participants. Furthermore, the usefulness of contextual in-
tegrity to investigate specific disruptions to existing SNSs, such as the addition
of incentives to LBSNs, has not yet been established.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have surveyed the recent literature proposing solutions to
privacy challenges in SNSs, and identified issues with the way researchers using
SNS data report on the ethical conduct of their studies. We note the following
points:
• There aremany proposed solutions to some of the usability and trust issues
with existing SNSs, but there remain open problems. When commercial
features are added to existing services, do people understand how the ex-
isting context has been perturbed, and are they provided usable controls
for deciding how their information is used?
• Acquiring dynamic consent may engage participants in the research pro-
cess and reduce the risk of violating their expectations, but it is not yet
known whether this can be applied to SNS research, and without placing
an unacceptable burden on participants.
• While SNS research is very popular, researchers often do not report on the
ethical conduct of their studies, which can cause difficulties when repro-
ducing experiments, or establishing the ethical legitimacy of a study.
• There are many domain-specific workflow tools for managing research
data, but so far none that consider the unique challenges of conducting
SNS research.
• Contextual integrity is a framework that has been used to study some SNSs,
but its applicability to examining the appropriateness of research meth-
odologies, and the role of commercial actors in LBSNs, has not been es-
tablished.
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In the rest of this thesis, we apply contextual integrity to the study of pri-
vacy, consent, and reproducibility, which we have discussed in this chapter.
In the next chapter, we introduce a framework that has been designed to
improve on the state of the art in reproducibility and ethics in SNS research,
which we will evaluate in a number of case studies. Informed by contextual
integrity principles, it enables the study of such systems in a manner that ought
to protect the expectations of participants.
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Chapter 4
AframeworkforethicalSNSresearch
In Chapter 2.3 we noted a range of challenges with conducting research us-
ing social network sites (SNSs), specifically with respect to gaining informed
consent, protecting the privacy of participants, and conducting research in a
reproducible manner. Our survey of the SNS literature in Chapter 3.3 identified
limited progress towards enabling reproducibility through the reporting of key
methodological details, and sharing of artefacts such as source code and data.
The challenges associated with conducting and reproducing SNS research
raise many interesting research issues and dilemmas, particularly involving the
sensitivity of the personal data that are communicated via SNSs. How can we
collect and analyse SNS data while respecting the privacy of SNS users? Can
we assume that data shared on an SNS are fair game for all researchers? Are
results from one SNS or set of SNS users representative of all users or all SNSs?
How can we share data with other researchers while maintaining the privacy of
participants?
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We propose an architecture for executing privacy-preserving SNS studies
that encode the workflow needed to reproduce the experiment.
• We evaluate the architecture by recreating an existing SNS study from the
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literature, to demonstrate how we encode the parameters of an experi-
ment, and illustrate how it preserves the privacy of participants.
To meet the challenges identified in Chapter 2.3, we suggest that an appro-
priate solution is to develop a lightweight framework that acts as middleware
between a researcher who wishes to make use of SNS data, and the providers of
such data. We have distilled these challenges into the following requirements:
1. In our survey in Chapter 3.3, we found that SNS research was conducted
using a wide variety of methodologies, including questionnaires, ethno-
graphic studies, user studies, and crawling the data provided by SNSs. The
architecture must enable all such studies, and we should be able to reuse
system components for different methodological approaches.
2. In Chapter 3.3 we identified a number of tools that enable the encoding
and sharing of experiment workflows. We did not find these sufficient for
encoding the specific details of SNS studies. Therefore, the architecture
must allow researchers to capture workflows, in terms of data acquisition,
and privacy and ethical requirements, so that experiments can be repeated
and experimental designs shared with other researchers.
3. Our survey noted that studies make use of a range of services, from cur-
rently popular services such as Facebook and Twitter, to now-obsolete
SNSs such as Friendster and MySpace. The architecture must allow exper-
iments to be run using data from a wide range of SNSs and other sources
of social data, to allow experiments to be conducted against a range of
data sources, without knowing details of their implementation. It should
be sufficiently extensible such that support for new services can be added
without any changes to the core framework.
4. As identified in Chapter 2.3.5, and illustrated in our survey, a barrier to
reproducibility is that the SNSs may change their APIs at any point, which
can break existing code, or indeed the whole service may cease to exist.
Our framework should mitigate the impact of these changes, by handling
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mismatches between new APIs and old code, and allowing the environment
of a defunct SNS to be emulated where it is no longer available, allowing
privacy-preserving requests to be made of legacy SNS datasets.
5. In Chapter 2.3.4, we noted how some previous SNS studies may have failed
to uphold their participants’ expectations of privacy. The theory of con-
textual integrity, which we introduce in Chapter 2.3.6, provides a frame-
work for designing systems to meet such expectations. The architecture
must maintain the contextual integrity of participants, by respecting the
context-appropriateness of information transfers.
4.1 The PRISONER architecture
We now present our architecture for privacy-sensitive social network exper-
iments, titled PRISONER (Privacy-Respecting Infrastructure for Social Online
Network Experimental Research).
Participation clients
Mobile
experiment
Web server
Web
experiment
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Web service
Experiment
Builder
Privacy policy
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design
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Figure 4.1: The PRISONER architecture, showing the flow of data between its three con-
stitutent components.
The architecture consists of three components, as shown in Figure 4.1. We
collect experimental data from a participant’s activity on an SNS (social activity
clients), and through participation in experimental interventions (participa-
tion clients). Both the social activity and participation clients feed and receive
data from the workflowmanagement component. The workflowmanager is re-
65
sponsible for ensuring that all data generated and analysed in the system reflect
privacy and ethical requirements; this includes data collected from third-party
SNSs, data generated for experimental purposes, and data that are fed back to
participants in interventions.
4.1.1 Social objects
At the core of PRISONER is an abstraction of SNSs, as a set of common ob-
jects, with service-specific extensions. Informed by the Activity Streams 2.0
standard [134], we implement a number of abstract types, which correspond
to common entities found in various SNSs, as we discussed in Chapter 2.1. We
term these social objects, which include:
• Notes: These encapsulate short text messages, which are analogous to
status updates in Facebook, or a tweet in Twitter.
• People: In the most abstract sense, these can represent any other human,
however each service can provide its own semantics about their signific-
ance within the context of that service. For example, a person might be
tagged in a photo in which they appear, or “own” a collection of notes,
such as a user’s timeline of tweets.
• Place: This represents the attributes of a location. This may be used to plot
a location on a map, or to provide location-specific context to a note. Such
abstractions are useful as LBSNs may implement “check-ins”in a variety
of ways, but can share a canonical representation of a location.
PRISONER contains a core implementation of eight social objects, which de-
scribes a common set of fields. References to these abstract social objects can
be made by an experiment, with the SNS-specific implementation resolved at
runtime.
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Listing 4.1 A short privacy policy for a PRISONER experiment allowing a parti-
cipant’s username and sanitised user ID to be collected
<policy for=”Facebook:User”>
<attributes>
<attribute type=”id”>
<attribute-policy allow=”retrieve”>
<transformations>
<transform type=”hash” level=”sha224” />
</transformations>
</attribute-policy>
</attribute>
<attribute type=”username”>
<attribute-policy allow=”retrieve” />
</attribute>
</attributes>
<object-policy allow=”retrieve”>
<object-criteria>
<attribute-match match=”author.id”
on_object=”session:Facebook.id” />
</object-criteria>
</object-policy>
</policy>
4.1.2 Privacy policies
PRISONER uses privacy policies, written by the researcher, to determine what
types of SNS data are appropriate for a study to handle, and what sanitisations
should be applied to protect the privacy of participants. Privacy policies use
an expressive XML schema to allow researchers to declare criteria for allowing
objects to be collected, depending on how permissive their application is, and
how reusable their policies need to be. Without a policy, an experiment is not
allowed to process any data. As shown in Listing 4.1, a policy consists of policy
elements, each corresponding to a social object. For maximum re-use, this can
refer to a generic social object, or with the inclusion of a namespace, an object
for an individual service, as in this example. Each object policy enumerates
the attributes of that object that need to be collected, with a policy for each
attribute declaring whether that attribute can only be retrieved or can also be
stored, and whether it needs to be sanitised before being made available to the
experiment. Sanitisations are requested by “transformations” elements, with a
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range of semantically-appropriate transformations available. In this example,
the user ID is hashed to avoid the researcher having direct access to it, while
a location attribute in a check-in object might be coarsened from an exact co-
ordinate to a city-level aggregation. Finally, the object policy contains object
criteria, which dictates which objects the researcher is limited to retrieving.
In this case, the criteria notes that only objects authored by the current par-
ticipant can be collected, meaning that only the participant’s own profile can
be retrieved. This prevents the researcher from accidentally collecting any data
beyond this scope.
Requiring researchers to explicitly specify the data they require in this man-
ner serves several purposes:
• Researchers are encouraged to think about the scale of data collection re-
quired by their experiment, requiring consideration of the contribution
each attribute of each object makes to answering their research questions.
• Policies can be written offline before experimental applications have been
developed, encouraging the data-collection practices of an experiment to
be iterated on independent of the application itself. This acts as a testable
specification of the requirements of a study. If at the time of implementa-
tion, further changes are required, this invites further scrutiny of why the
original policy was insufficient, and to iterate on creating a more appro-
priate policy, rather than simply collecting all possible data.
• Policies can be rendered in a human-readable format that can be used as
supporting documentation for IRB review, or as part of informed consent
forms to give to participants.
• While researchers can still choose to simply collect all attributes of all
objects, the use of policy-driven consent forms should encourage better
practices, as potential participants may be dissuaded from taking part in
a study that demands significant amounts of data without justification.
• Policies can be shared with other researchers, as a way of distributing
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workflows, even if the source code for an experimental application is not
shared. Researchers who are reproducing or building on previous work
can therefore recreate the same data-collection practices as the original
study. Even if other researchers do not use PRISONER, the policy provides
a human-readable description of the experiment’s workflow.
We now explain how each of these components were designed, and how their
implementation in PRISONER fulfils the requirements discussed earlier.
4.1.3 Participation clients
These are the experimental applications that interface with the PRISONER sys-
tem. These can be of any form, including questionnaires, mobile applications
that use the experience sampling method (ESM) [47], or alternative interfaces
to existing social network sites. They interface with PRISONER using its API,
which provides a consistent way of handling all the services that PRISONER
supports. As PRISONER is able to resolve references to generic social objects
to their service-specific implementations, this allows the same participation
client to be re-used in experiments that target different services without sub-
stantial rewriting required.
4.1.4 Social activity clients
Social activity clients are systems that provide social data that a researcher
might wish to use or generate. For the purposes of this thesis, they are likely to
be SNSs such as Facebook, however ultimately any system or dataset of a social
nature could be implemented. As Social activity clients take many forms, PRIS-
ONER mediates between their implementations with an API layer called service
gateways.
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Listing 4.2 A fragment of the Facebook service gateway, showing how “liked”
pages are retrieved.
def Like(self, operation, payload):
# handle requests to retrieve Likes
if (operation == ”GET”):
try:
# requests are keyed on the ID of the user who liked pages
user_id = payload
# populate a Person social object with the identity of the user
author = SocialObjects.Person()
author.id = user_id
# make a request to the FB Graph API for the user’s likes
result_set = self.get_graph_data(”/” + user_id + ”/likes”)
like_obj_list = []
# paginate through the collection of likes and add information
# about each page to a list
while ((result_set.has_key(”paging”)) and (result_set[”paging”].has_key
(”next”))):
like_obj_list.extend(result_set[”data”])
result_set = self.get_graph_data(result_set[”paging”]
[”next”])
likes = []
# for each of the raw likes we retrieved, populate a
# Page social object with the appropriate attributes
for like in like_obj_list:
this_like = Page()
this_like.displayName = self.get_value(like, ”name”)
this_like.id = self.get_value(like, ”id”)
this_like.url = ”https://www.facebook.com/” + this_like.id
this_like.author = author
this_like.category = self.get_value(like,”category”)
this_like.image = self.graph_uri + ”/” + this_like.id +
”/picture?type=large” + ”&access_token=” + self.access_token
likes.append(this_like)
# any collection of objects is associated with the SNS it came from
# to avoid any interop issues
likes_coll = SocialObjects.Collection()
likes_coll.author = author
likes_coll.provider = ”Facebook”
likes_coll.objects = likes
return likes_coll
except:
# if there are no likes to get, return an empty set
return SocialObjects.Collection()
70
Service gateways
The role of a service gateway is to translate between the native responses provided
by the API of a social activity client, and the social objects that PRISONER can
parse. As with the rest of the architecture, service gateways are implemented in
Python as modules conforming to a specification, in which methods are written
for each type of social object the service supports. The architecture was writ-
ten in Python as the language is well-supported, and its dynamic introspec-
tion capabilities were useful for resolving references to aspects of the system at
runtime. The social objects gateways handle can include the generic social ob-
jects discussed earlier, or service-specific ones. Each method handles requests
to retrieve or publish one or more social objects of that type.1 GET requests
return a fully-formed social object of the type named by the method, match-
ing criteria included in the request, such as a user ID, as shown in Listing 4.2.
POST requests create objects of the named type, given a payload provided in the
request, and publish these to the relevant SNS. PRISONER includes a number
of gateways for common SNSs, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Last.fm. If re-
searchers need to add support for an additional service, they must first write a
service gateway module to wrap the API of the required service.
4.1.5 Workﬂowmanagement
This component represents PRISONER’s core, and is responsible for delegating
requests from participation clients to service gateways, validating policies for
experiments, sanitising social objects, and exposing interfaces for researchers
such as a Web service. It consists of the following modules:
1Adopting the parlance of the HTTP specification, these are referred to as GET and POST re-
quests respectively.
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Experiment Builder
When a participant begins using a PRISONER experiment, the system must be
supplied with some metadata describing the experiment, including:
• The privacy policy, which dictates which data the experiment can collect.
• The experimental design, which describes the structure of any data that
should be stored, such as the responses to a questionnaire.
• The name of the study, and contact details for the researcher.
• A list of services the participant needs to be authenticated with.
• A callback URL to redirect the participant to after authentication.
The experiment builder generates a front-end to the experiment using this in-
formation. All future requests can then be validated against the correct policies.
Policy Processor
This module is responsible for validating and sanitising all requests to retrieve
and publish social objects. Using the privacy policy provided by the experiment
builder, when an experimental application requests data from an SNS, it ensures
an experiment is allowed to process the type of the object requested, and applies
any sanitisation strategies that have been requested.
PersistenceManager
Thismodule handles the storage of data retrieved or generated during the course
of an experiment, including sanitised instances of social objects. The persist-
ence manager infers and maintains the database schema based on the experi-
ment’s policy, and abstracts the researcher from maintaining the database it-
self, by providing APIs to retrieve data in line with the experiment’s policy
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without over-exposing sensitive information. It maintains the logical rela-
tionships between objects, which might be based on sensitive keys such as a
user’s ID, allowing data to be returned to the researcher without such details
being known or exposed to them.
Social Object Gateway
This module is used to coordinate the activity of other parts of the system. It
provides a single interface for initiating requests, dispatching requests and con-
verting raw objects into a form that can be used by experiments. Experiments
can access this interface directly, but are more likely to use the Web service.
Web service
The Web service is the primary interface to PRISONER, providing a Web-based
wrapper around the Social Object Gateway. An experiment begins by provid-
ing PRISONER with the policies for the experiment, which internally uses the
experiment builder to configure the parameters of the study. The participant
visits a Web address provided by PRISONER to register for the experiment. This
assigns a unique identifier for the participant, and uses the authorisationmech-
anics for the underlying service to allow the experiment to access the parti-
cipant’s account with that service. PRISONER maintains the credentials needed
to access the underlying services in a session object, which are not directly ex-
posed to individual experiments. From then on, the experiment makes requests
for data to PRISONER, using the participant’s session cookie for authentication.
If, for example, an experiment needs to retrieve the photos from a participant’s
Facebook account, it can make a HTTP GET request to the following URL:
https://prisoner.cs.st-andrews.ac.uk/prisoner/get/Facebook/Photo/session
:Facebook.id
PRISONER recognises the “session” namespace at the end of the URL, and
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substitutes this with the ID of the participant’s Facebook account. Internally,
the request is processed using the components discussed earlier, before return-
ing a JSON array of sanitised Photo objects to the experiment.
4.1.6 Designing for contextual integrity
Our fifth design requirement is that our architecture maintains the contextual
integrity of participants. As we discussed in Chapter 2.3.6, privacy violations
can result when someone’s expectations about the reasonable flow of inform-
ation are not met. This can explain the sense of violation that were associated
with the two studies we considered in Chapter 2.3.4. To avoid a repeat of such
incidents, we consider how the design of PRISONER can mitigate this.
First, we consider transparency to be key to upholding contextual integrity.
The specification of data-handling practices encoded in an experiment’s pri-
vacy policy is useful, not just because it provides a way of encoding these details,
but as the policy is enforced at runtime, there is no scope for the stated ethical
practices of an experiment, whether communicated to IRBs or participants, to
be inaccurate. Therefore, when a participant completes a consent form that
has been generated from a PRISONER policy, they can trust that the consent
they give is to an experiment as described. This is important, as even when
researchers make good faith efforts to protect the privacy of participants, there
is still the risk of violation, as we found in Chapter 2.3.4. To mitigate concerns
about inappropriate flows of information, we require researchers to specify how
information is managed throughout the lifecycle of the experiment. By com-
municating to participants what information is collected and stored, and how it
is sanitised, they are given explicit information about the flow of information,
which helps to uphold contextual integrity.
As we discussed in Chapter 2.3.3, the acquisition of consent in a secured
fashion is divorced from the data collection practices of the study itself. Whether
this consent is informed or meaningful can be difficult to determine, if the im-
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plications of consenting to such data collection are difficult to appreciate. The
approach we take with PRISONER aims to leverage people’s understanding of
the SNSs they already use to make their consent decisions more meaningful.
By embedding these decisions within the context of the SNS itself, and not as
an abstract process, we believe that this better maintains contextual integrity.
4.1.7 Dealingwith API changes
The development of PRISONER has met with some challenges. Chiefly among
these are dealing with changes made to the APIs provided by social network
sites. As discussed in Chapter 2.3.5, these APIs are often volatile, with frequent
changes to the interfaces that affect which endpoints developers can use, lim-
itations on how the APIs are used, or changes to which parameters endpoints
accept, or what they return. One of PRISONER’s main goals is to improve the
state of reproducibility in SNS research, which is made more difficult if re-
searchers cannot be confident that code that targets a specific SNS will still be
usable, even in the near future. While we cannot completely solve this issue,
as the availability of an SNS and its API is out of our control, we have adopted
a few strategies to mitigate its effects.
First, PRISONER includes a versioning scheme in service gateways. Each
method can incorporate version-specific behaviours, either to target requests
at an explicit version of the API provided by the SNS, or to translate requests
targeted at an older API version, to the format expected by a new one. The in-
tention of this approach is to be completely transparent to an individual exper-
imental application, and require no adjustment on their part. An experiment’s
design policy can indicate which logical version of an API it is designed to tar-
get. At runtime, PRISONER will attempt to mediate between these changes by
compensating for differences between the old and current API, which might be
appropriate if an endpoint has changed name, or parameters are provided in
a different, but semantically identical format. Only if an API call is no longer
able to return a sensible result, for example if an endpoint has been completely
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removed, does PRISONER raise an exception to indicate that the request can
no longer be completed. This approach allows some “breaking” changes to be
absorbed by the service gateway, without affecting the outward interface to ap-
plications. In addition, the service gateway can expose additional functionality
to newer applications if an API endpoint has been enhanced, without breaking
compatibility with older applications.
This approach was developed in response to a suite of API changes Facebook
made between 2014 and 2015, in its transition from version 1.0 to 2.x of its Graph
API. The Graph API is Facebook’s primary interface for providing applications
with access to the data and functionality exposed by the service. To determine
the appropriateness of our strategy, we examined how many of the breaking
changes in this update could be absorbed by changes to the service gateway,
without any impact on old experimental applications. While changes in this
version were far-reaching, affecting various platform-specific SDKs and login
processes, we only consider the endpoints that related to social objects already
implemented in our Facebook service gateway. We found that four endpoints
were removed, four endpoints were modified, and twenty four API permissions
were removed. Of the four removed endpoints, we were able to map requests for
three to different endpoints with no loss in the accuracy of the data returned.
One removed endpoint, /me/notes, coincided with the deprecation of a blogging
application called “Notes”, with no appropriate replacement. With the excep-
tion of the permissions for accessing notes, we were able to map all permissions
to their replacements to maintain access to these data. Of the modified end-
points, we were able to mitigate their effects in all but one case. Applications
are no longer able to access a full list of friends using the /me/friends endpoint,
instead only accessing the friends who have installed the same app. As this
significantly alters the semantics of this endpoint, PRISONER injects a con-
fidence warning into the object returned by this endpoint to signal that is not
representative. Older applications can ignore this and make use of the subset
of data available, while newer applications can interpret this warning to make
a determination of the quality of the data. Importantly, while this exercise does
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not resolve all issues with API changes, in this example, we can demonstrate
that PRISONER provides a significantly higher degree of reproducibility than
applications that directly interface with the API, without any changes being
made to individual experimental applications.
4.2 Reproducing an experimentwith PRISONER
In Chapter 3.3, we identified issues with reproducibility in social network site
research. We now explore the process of recreating an experiment with PRIS-
ONER, to illustrate how it improves on the state of reproducibility. To do this,
we examine one paper identified in our survey [66], and reproduce its data col-
lection procedures. We choose this paper as it is the only study in our analysis
to meet all ten criteria, suggesting it should be possible to fully recreate its
procedures.
Our chosen paper [66] studies attitudes towards information-sharing with
third-party Facebook applications, by evaluating how well participants under-
stand the data-handling practices of applications, and the differences between
features operated by Facebook and applications provided by third-parties. The
authors built a Facebook application to deliver a survey about privacy attitudes,
which masqueraded as a personality quiz to encourage participation. Parti-
cipants believed their responses would be used to classify them as one of a num-
ber of personality types. In reality, the application measured a participant’s
level of engagement with Facebook based on how many profile attributes they
disclose (such as age, gender, and work history), and how many status up-
dates they shared. This was used to provide a classification “for entertainment
value” to the participant, while providing a quantitative measure of how much
information they disclose on Facebook. To achieve this, the researchers collec-
ted significant amounts of information from a participant’s profile using the
Facebook API. The authors note that they:
“...collected data about each respondent’s profile (but no actual profile data)
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in order to compute measures of how much information people were sharing
on Facebook. For most fields we computed a simple binary score (1 if the field
contained data, 0 if blank) or a count if available (such as the total number of
status updates and the number of status updates in the past 30 days).”
This suggests that at no stage were any sensitive data stored, but in or-
der to compute these measures, requests for the data had to be made. In this
instance, the authors make good faith efforts to protect the privacy of their par-
ticipants, but in replications, such details are easily overlooked, and could easily
lead to inappropriate quantities of information being stored. We note that the
deception employed in the original study raises ethical questions about the ap-
propriateness of misleading participants into the collection of data pertaining
to them, however for the purposes of this analysis we are concerned only with
the data collection exercise itself and not its purpose. The authors also justify
the use of deception, and the procedures were approved by their IRB.
This study is ideal to model using PRISONER, as it relies on the collection
of large quantities of data, while demonstrating a clear workflow that dictates
how data should be sanitised and aggregated through the duration of the ex-
periment. To recreate this workflow with PRISONER, we create a privacy policy
that encodes the requirements we have discussed, in terms of which SNSs are
accessed, which data types we require, and how they should be sanitised. We
then write an exemplar Web-based application that supplies this policy to the
PRISONER Web service, then makes requests to the PRISONER API whenever
Facebook data are required.
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Listing 4.3 A fragment of the privacy policy for the experiment we reproduce,
showing how some of the attributes of the participant’s profile are collected
and immediately sanitised.
<policy for=”Facebook:User”>
<attributes>
<attribute type=”id”>
<attribute-policy allow=”retrieve”>
<transformations>
<transform type=”hash” level=”sha224” />
</transformations>
</attribute-policy>
<attribute-policy allow=”store”>
<transformations>
<transform type=”hash” level=”sha224” />
</transformations>
</attribute-policy>
</attribute>
<attribute type=”gender”>
<attribute-policy allow=”retrieve”>
<transformations>
<transform type=”reduce” level=”bit” />
</transformations>
</attribute-policy>
<attribute-policy allow=”store”>
<transformations>
<transform type=”reduce” level=”bit” />
</transformations>
</attribute-policy>
</attribute>
</attributes>
<object-policy allow=”retrieve”>
<object-criteria>
<attribute-match match=”author.id”
on_object=”session:Facebook.id” />
</object-criteria>
</object-policy>
<object-policy allow=”store”>
<object-criteria>
<attribute-match match=”author.id”
on_object=”session:Facebook.id” />
</object-criteria>
</object-policy>
</policy>
</p:privacy-policy>
To illustrate how this works in practice, we take each of the criteria in the
methods category of our survey, and explain how we apply PRISONER to achieve
that aspect of reproducibility. A fragment of the privacy policy that we created
for this example is illustrated in Listing 4.3, and available in full online [48].
• SourceSNS - To replicate this study, we need to collect data from Facebook.
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PRISONER allows researchers to request generic social objects that exist on
various SNSs. As this experiment only uses a single SNS, however, we
make this explicit in the experiment’s privacy policy. We create policies
for each type of object our experiment needs to retrieve. Our policy for
Facebook:User only allows us to retrieve profile information from that SNS
as it is explicitly namespaced. This policy can be shared with others to
ensure any further data collection comes from the same service, while a
policy for a generic Person object could allow a replication to use data from
any compatible SNS.
• Length of study - This study requires us to collect all of a participant’s
status updates in order to determine how many have been posted. PRIS-
ONER allows privacy policies to include temporal constraints on the data
collected. This ensures that when the policy is reused, data from evolving
sources, such as Facebook status updates, are only accessible from the
same time period, or over the same duration. This study requires that a
user’s entire history of status updates is collected, so that the total num-
ber can be counted, so we did not provide an explicit time limit in this
instance.
• Data processing - This study outlines some crucial data sanitisation re-
quirements that must be preserved to both replicate the conditions of the
study and preserve participant privacy. As described earlier, we do not
need to collect the content of profile attributes or status updates, but rather
a count of how many are accessible. When manually evoking the Facebook
API to do this, it would be necessary to collect the sensitive data then
manually sanitise it. While achieving the desired result, this is not ideal,
due to the possibility that data may be inappropriately stored in an unsan-
itised form, especially when using third-party bindings that may imple-
ment their own clientside caching behaviours. This may risk participant
privacy.
By encoding these data-handling requirements in a declarative manner in
the experiment’s privacy policy, researchers do not need to be concerned
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Figure 4.2: Part of the consent form that participants would be shown before taking
part in the reproduced experiment. The form outlines the data collection practices of
the study in a readable format. Participants who want to learn more about how their
information is handled can read detailed descriptions of the sanitisations employed.
with such implementation details. To ensure we do not inadvertently col-
lect too much information, we only request the id attributes from status
updates, as shown in the attributes collection in Listing 4.1. On all other
requests for sensitive attributes, such as work history or gender, we use
reduce transformations whenever we retrieve data. The bit attribute im-
mediately sanitises the response from the Facebook API to only return 1 if
the attribute is present, or 0 if it is not, before the data are made available
to the experimental application. As well as only collecting the number of
profile attributes, the study requires that “respondents’ Facebook user IDs
were hashed for anonymization purposes”. The transformation policy for
the User object shows we hash the user ID using SHA-224 after retrieving
it. Note that while this technique is commonly used to provide a degree
of obfuscation, it is not impervious to attack. PRISONER does not provide
any guarantees about the anonymity afforded by use of such techniques.
• Consent - The authors note that “a consent statement appeared on the first
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page of the survey”, but this is not sufficient to replicate the study, as lan-
guage used to obtain consent can impact the results of SNS research [88].
As all attributes collected from SNSs are encoded in an experiment’s policy,
PRISONER can generate participant consent forms that explain which SNSs
data are collected from, which attributes are collected, and how data are
processed through the life of the experiment. This information is provided
in a consistent, human-readable format that ensures a participant’s in-
formed consent is tied to the exact procedures of the experiment, as il-
lustrated in Figure 4.2. When PRISONER workflows are replicated, the
consent language is consistent.
• IRB/Ethics - The authors explain that “our design was reviewed and ap-
proved by our university’s IRB.” While it is encouraging to see this con-
firmed, the tendency to not share IRB protocols presents some challenges
to reproducibility, particularly where the actual procedures of an experi-
ment have drifted from the previously agreed protocol, so-called “ethical
drift”. While it is beyond the scope of PRISONER to resolve these chal-
lenges, allowing researchers to share a testable specification of the data-
handling requirements of a study with their IRB when making an applic-
ation, rather than a speculative protocol, constitutes an improvement on
the state of the art.
• Participant brieﬁng - The authors explain some of their briefing proced-
ures, particularly “Our university’s name and seal were featured promin-
ently on every page of the survey and on the app’s home page on Face-
book.”, which may have a priming effect and is important to be able to
replicate. While researchers are responsible for conducting their own par-
ticipant briefing, PRISONER provides a consistent “bookending” experi-
ence, including the presentation of consent forms, which explain the pro-
cedures of the experiment. This, when augmented by other cosmetic de-
tails, such as those outlined by the researchers in this study, provides a
degree of consistency between replications.
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Figure 4.3: The result of making requests to Facebook with a PRISONER policy applied.
Only the permitted objects and attributes are extracted, and are sanitised as outlined
in the policy.
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<attribute-policy allow="retrieve">
<transformations>
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of how a request for data is handled by PRISONER. An experi-
mental application makes a request to PRISONER’s social objects gateway for an ob-
ject, which is delegated to the appropriate social network. The object is returned and
handled by PRISONER’s policy processor, which invokes the privacy policy for the ex-
periment to ensure the data are suitably sanitised. In this example, the participant’s
birthday has been reduced to a bit indicating its presence before being returned to the
application.
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We do not replicate the entire experiment in the study that we examine [66],
but rather recreate its data collection requirements that we demonstrate in a
simple example that attempts to retrieve a plethora of information about par-
ticipants, with the sanitised results depicted in Figure 4.3.
As discussed earlier, this experiment requires access to a participant’s Face-
book profile to determime the presence of certain attributes. Figure 4.4 il-
lustrates how data are handled by the framework for one such attribute. As
shown, at the beginning of the experiment, the participant provides the PRIS-
ONER gateway with access to their Facebook account, binding this to their
PRISONER session, and ensuring any requests for profile data are made via
the PRISONER proxy. When the experimental application requests these data,
PRISONER’s policy processor consults the application’s privacy policy for an
appropriate “retrieve” clause to determine whether the application can access
the attribute, and if any sanitisation should occur. In the example shown, the
experimental application needs to determine whether the participant discloses
their birthday. Thus, the policy processor sanitises the attribute before making
it available to the application, and the sensitive attributes are discarded.
Having produced a policy file, it can be distributed to other researchers who
can subsequently replicate the workflow. Even if researchers do not have access
to the original code for the experiment, they can build an application against the
same policy to make requests for data. They bootstrap an instance of PRISONER
by pointing to the policy. PRISONER then generates all consent forms, briefing
materials, and provides access to the SNS authentication flow and sanitisa-
tion API. In addition, if a researcher wished to run the same experiment using,
e.g., Twitter as the source SNS, simply replacing any reference to “Facebook”
with “Twitter” will provide this without any further modification. In this ex-
ample, we have shown how an experiment can be managed by PRISONER in a
reproducible and ethical manner. Even if we were to conduct this experiment
and not share our application’s source code, other researchers can replicate the
experiment in their environment of their choice, but re-use our experiment’s
workflow to ensure data are collected under the same conditions. It is import-
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ant to note, however, that workflow sharing alone is not sufficient to guarantee
the accuracy of replications, particularly as this may not consider all possible
corner cases that could affect the result of a replication. As we have discussed,
a wider culture change is needed to achieve a higher degree of reproducibility.
The PRISONER tools have been made available to the academic community, 2
with examples and documentation to help researchers run their own experi-
ments, and a Docker image which allows quick evaluation of a PRISONER in-
stance and accompanying example application.
4.3 Addressing the requirements
Returning to the requirements we expressed at the beginning of this chapter,
we summarise how the architecture we have outlined achieves these objectives,
while discussing which aspects of the framework have yet to be realised.
1. In our survey in Chapter 3.3, we found that SNS research was conducted using
a wide variety of methodologies, including questionnaires, ethnographic studies,
user studies, and crawling thedata providedby SNSs. Thearchitecturemust enable
all such studies, and we should be able to reuse system components for different
methodological approaches.
PRISONER is agnostic about the nature of the experiments it is used to
conduct. In Chapter 4.2, we recreated one type of user study. In the rest
of this thesis, we will outline two other experiments that used PRISONER,
demonstrating its versatility. In Chapter 5, we use the framework to col-
lect information from participants’ Facebook profiles to present to them
in a questionnaire, while in Chapter 6, we will use the framework in a
mobile user study to sensitively handle location data. The framework has
also been used in a study of sharing preferences [88]. In further work, we
will conduct further experiments to determine whether the framework’s
2http://prisoner.cs.st-andrews.ac.uk
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design and policy language is sufficiently expressive for all SNS experi-
ments.
2. The architecture must allow researchers to capture workflows, in terms of data
acquisition, and privacy and ethical requirements, so that experiments can be re-
peated and experimental designs shared with other researchers.
We have introduced an expressive policy language that allows researchers
to encode the requirements of their experiment in a human and machine-
readable format. In Chapter 4.2, we showed that this was sufficient to
reproduce an experiment from the literature. From the experiments con-
ducted with the framework so far, we have found the policy language to
be able to encode data acquisition requirements, and our ability to gen-
erate consent documentation constitutes an improvement on the state of
the art with respect to encoding ethical requirements of a study. At this
stage, however, the framework does not allow all methodological details
to be encoded, and as such does not replicate all aspects of an SNS experi-
ment. Specifically, we have not yet shown how PRISONER could be used to
encode the sampling strategy of an experiment, and we have not yet de-
veloped the framework to be easily portable, such that another researcher
can easily reproduce an experiment based on the policy of an experiment.
3. The architecture must allow experiments to be run using data from a wide range
of SNSs and other sources of social data, to allow experiments to be conducted
against a range of data sources, without knowing details of their implementa-
tion. It should be sufficiently extensible such that support for new services can be
added without any changes to the core framework.
In our current implementation, we have full support for Facebook, Twit-
ter, and Last.fm, based on the requirements of the experiments we discuss
in this thesis, and for other projects. These service gateways have been
developed by others in accordance with our service gateway specification,
which is testament to the expressiveness of the specification, and the abil-
ity for others to implement it. So far, however, we have only demonstrated
the applicability of the specification to existing SNSs, and we have not yet
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evaluated whether it is appropriate for querying other sources, such as
adapters for existing datasets.
4. As identified inChapter 2.3.5, and illustrated in our survey, a barrier to reproducib-
ility is that the SNSs may change their APIs at any point, which can break existing
code, or indeed the whole service may cease to exist. Our framework should mit-
igate the impact of these changes, by handlingmismatches between newAPIs and
old code, and allowing the environment of a defunct SNS to be emulated where it
is no longer available, allowing privacy-preserving requests to be made of legacy
SNS datasets.
Obsolescence is a significant challenge for SNS research, and not one our
current implementation solves. The first issue, breaking API changes, is
somewhat mitigated by the versioning scheme we discuss in Chapter 4.1.7,
but this requires maintenance of the service gateway implementation, and
may not be sufficient for all API changes. Supporting a completely defunct
SNS is not an issue we have addressed in the current implementation.
5. The architecture must maintain the contextual integrity of participants, by re-
specting the context-appropriateness of information transfers.
The designwe have adopted aims tomaintain contextual integrity by provid-
ing transparency to participants about how their data are processed, en-
suring there is no disparity between what data collection a participant
agrees to, and the data that are collected about them. Furthermore, con-
sent acquisition is embedded into the same context as data collection, to
remove ambiguity about the practices of a study.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a framework for conducting ethical and
privacy-preserving SNS experiments, informed by contextual integrity. We
note the following:
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• By using standards-based Social Objects and sanitising data before they
are analysed or presented to participants, we have shown how we can run
experiments that scale across a number of social network sites, without
collecting or disclosing sensitive data.
• We have demonstrated how the framework supports reproducibility by re-
creating an experiment from the literature, allowing us to share the pro-
tocol so it can be executed by others.
• We have discussed how our workflow management tools constitute an im-
provement on the state of the art, but acknowledge that the current im-
plementation does not address a number of the requirements we believe
such a framework should achieve.
In the next chapter, we discuss the first of two experiments that use the
framework, applying contextual integrity a significant methodological chal-
lenges we identified earlier: acquiring informed consent for SNS studies.
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Chapter 5
Improving SNS research methodolo-
gieswith contextual integrity
In Chapter 2.3.3, we identified a number of challenges with obtaining informed
consent in SNS studies, while in Chapter 3.3.5, we found that reporting of the
ethical conduct of studies, including whether consent was sought from par-
ticipants, is lacking. This raises the question of whether traditional forms of
informed consent are sufficient for conducting research using SNSs, where lots
of sensitive data may be collected. We investigate this by applying contextual
integrity to the process of acquiring consent. Leveraging social norms of will-
ingness to share data with researchers, we will determine whether this can be
an appropriate proxy for asking people’s explicit consent to share each piece of
data.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We develop a means of quantifying norms for sharing SNS data with re-
searchers.
• We introduce a new method for acquiring informed consent, informed by
contextual integrity.
• We evaluate this method by applying our framework from Chapter 4, com-
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paring the effectiveness of our method to two other methods often used
in SNS research, assessing its performance by the accuracy of the method,
and the burden placed on participants.
In Chapter 2.3.3, we characterised informed consent as being secured or sus-
tained in nature, noting a tension between the accuracy of the method for gain-
ing consent, and the burden put on participants. In this chapter, we propose
a third way of acquiring consent that aims to achieve similar accuracy to the
sustained approach, while placing a low burden on participants, as with the
secured approach. This approach is informed by Nissenbaum’s model of con-
textual integrity, which we introduced in Chapter 2.3.6. We leverage the notion
of context-appropriate social norms, to determine what amount of informa-
tion is deemed socially acceptable to be collected by researchers, as a proxy for
asking participants to explicitly sanction the sharing of each individual piece of
data, as in the sustained approach.
We evaluate this approach in the context of SNS research, in a study that
asks participants to share data from their Facebook profiles with a researcher.
By detecting whether participants conform to norms of willingness to share
such data, we aim to reduce the number of times we need to explicitly ask for
their consent, with minimal loss in accuracy. We compare its performance to
the secured and sustained approaches based on the two measures of accuracy
and participant burden.
We hypothesise the following:
• H1: Acquiring consent to share SNS data with researchers using contextual
integrity reduces the burden compared to current methods of acquiring
explicit sustained consent, while more accurately reflecting people’s intent
than secured consent methods that involve no such interventions.
• H2: Acquiring consent with contextual integrity is as robust to temporal
changes in willingness to share data as sustained consent.
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5.1 Method
To test these hypotheses, we designed a study to investigate whether a method
for acquiring sustained informed consent based on contextual integrity per-
forms better than two other strategies. These can be summarised as:
• Secured consent: Participants provide up-front consent to data acquisition
in an informed consent form.
• Contextual integrity consent: Participants are asked explicitly about their
willingness to share each piece of data, unless they clearly conform to or
deviate from a social norm for sharing such data.
• Sustained consent: Participants are asked explicitly about their willingness
to share each piece of data.
5.1.1 Willingness-to-share norms
Our contextual integrity method requires a set of social norms of willingness to
share SNS data with researchers, in order to determine whether participants’
behaviour can be considered norm-conformant.
A previous study produced a relevant dataset showing people’s willingness
to share SNS data of various types with researchers [88]. In this study, parti-
cipants were asked which of 100 pieces of their Facebook data they were willing
to share with researchers, of the following types:
• Location check-ins by the user
• Names of Facebook friends
• “Liked” Facebook pages
• Photos uploaded by the user
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Figure 5.1: Boxplot showing sharing rates of different data types for users in the sus-
tained consent condition in the 2014 study. For comparison, the white diamonds rep-
resent themean sharing rate of that type in the 2012 dataset, constituting the prevailing
norm. Willingness to share data with researchers has increased on all fronts in this
period.
• Photo albums created by the user
• Biographical attributes
• Status updates
We consider the proportion of shared content for each attribute to represent
the norm for that attribute, as depicted by the white diamonds in Figure 5.1.
We draw on these norms in our study to determine the extent to which our
participants conform with them.
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Figure 5.2: A screenshot of a question in the study. In this case, the participant is asked
to share the fact that they like a Facebook page with the researchers.
5.1.2 User study
To evaluate our method of consent using contextual integrity, we conducted
a user study. Participants were recruited online (through advertisements in
university mailing lists, Twitter, and Reddit) for a study that modelled the three
consent strategies and evaluated their performance in terms of accuracy and
burden, with participants randomly assigned to one of these strategies. The
study comprised two parts: consent acquisition and a performance evaluation.
In the consent acquisition phase, participants were asked about their will-
ingness to share up to 100 of pieces of data randomly extracted from their Face-
book profile with researchers conducting a hypothetical study into “how emo-
tions spread on Facebook” (Figure 5.2). These data were of the types found
in the norms dataset, with the exception of biographical attributes, which we
excluded as these data are static in nature, and not likely to exhibit interest-
ing temporal properties. The strategy the participant was assigned to affected
the presentation of this step. The purpose of this step was to infer a “consent
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policy”, which represented the subset of the data the participant was willing to
share, according to the rules of that strategy, which we explain for each condi-
tion later.
As we are unaware of other attempts to quantify the norms for sharing SNS
data, we used a simple method for determining participants’ conformity to the
norms derived from the source dataset, which we use in our contextual integrity
condition. After each participant answered a question, we performed a series
of chi-square equality of proportions tests, comparing the distribution of re-
sponses by the participant for each data type to the distribution of the norm. If
p ≤ 0.1, we considered the participant to conform to the norm, and all further
questions of that type were removed. If p ≥ 0.9, we considered the participant
to deviate from the norm, and again all questions of that type were removed.
As the chi-square test assumes there are at least five counts in each cell, we
did not attempt to calculate norm conformity until the participant shared five
items of a given attribute. Therefore, the method is not robust to those who
share very small amounts of data. We chose to test at the 0.1 significance level,
as early piloting of the method allowed a determination to be made about con-
formity within a small number of questions while maintaining accuracy. The
results of this study will be used to vindicate this design decision.
Secured consent
Participants in all conditions were asked to complete a boilerplate informed
consent form, in accordance with current best practices and the ethical require-
ments of our institution. For participants in the secured consent condition, an
additional question was injected in to the consent form, adapted from a clause
in Facebook’s Data Use Policy: “I understand the researchers may use Facebook
data they receive about me for data analysis, testing, and research.” For these
participants, completing this form was treated as the participant giving con-
sent to all 100 pieces of content being processed for the purpose of the study,
forming the consent policy, and ending the consent acquisition phase.
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Contextual integrity consent
Participants were shown, in turn, each of the 100 pieces of data collected, and
asked whether they were willing to share it with the researchers. This strategy
aimed to reduce the number of questions, however, by constantly evaluating
whether the participant conformed to the prevailing social norm of willingness
to share that type of data. Each time a participant answered a question, their
norm conformity was measured for each of the six data types they were asked
about, removing redundant questions if conformity was established. After the
participant completed this phase, the consent policy was based on the propor-
tions of each data type the participant was willing to share. The final policy
consisted of the content explicitly shared by the participant, augmented by ad-
ditional content consistent with these proportions.
Sustained consent
The presentation of this method was similar to the contextual integrity condi-
tion, in that all questions were shown in turn to the participant, but no ques-
tions were removed, as no norm conformity calculations were made. The con-
sent policy contained the subset of attributes explicitly shared by the parti-
cipant.
The second phase of the study, the performance evaluation, was the same for
all conditions. Participants were shown all of the data in their consent policy,
and asked to click on any items that they did not wish to have shared, as shown
in Figure 5.3.
A week after the study was completed, participants were asked to complete
the study again. Assigned to the same condition, participants completed the
same process, with a different random subset of data.
Our study allows the following metrics to be calculated:
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Figure 5.3: A screenshot of the performance evaluation step. Participants are shown the
content collected according to their consent policy, and asked to remove any items they
deem inappropriate to share. The proportion of items selected determines the accuracy
of the method.
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• Burden: How long the participants spent participating in the study. This
is measured as the percentage of potential questions that were presented
to the participant. For secured consent this is 0%, as the method assumes
that participants were willing to share everything. For sustained con-
sent, this is 100%, as all participants were asked the maximum number
of questions. The burden of the contextual integrity condition lies some-
where between these two extremes, with fewer questions asked depending
on the participant’s norm conformity throughout the study.
• Accuracy: How successfully the consent strategy meets the intent of users.
This is measured as the percentage of data in the consent policy that the
participant was also willing to share in the performance evaluation step.
We expect the accuracy of the sustained consent condition to be very high
as all participants explicitly chose which data to share, while in the secured
condition, accuracy is likely to be much lower and more variable between
participants, as they did not choose which content would be in the consent
policy.
• Robustness: As discussed in Chapter 2.1, willingness to share social net-
work data is temporally sensitive, so we repeated the study after a week to
observe the extent to which this effect manifests, and to determine which
methods are more robust to it. The accuracy of using answers from the
first week to predict responses to the second week provides this measure,
as it will highlight whether each method is sensitive to changes in will-
ingness to share information over time. We use this time period as the
literature demonstrates that privacy decisions are able to change within a
week [5].
5.1.3 Applying the PRISONER framework
When conducting this experiment, we used the PRISONER framework intro-
duced in Chapter 4. As a Facebook service gateway had been developed for a
previous study [88], it was trivial to develop the interactions with Facebook. A
99
policy was written that ensured the experimental application could only retrieve
Facebook data for the purposes of presenting questions to participants. As the
content of these data were irrelevant to the study, the policy ensured that this
content was not stored by the experiment application.
Before conducting the study, our experimental design was scrutinised and
approved by an ethics committee within the School of Computer Science.
5.2 Results
Condition Started Completed week
1
Completed week
2
Secured consent 41 32 22
Sustained consent 55 39 24
Contextual
integrity consent
58 38 25
Table 5.1: Participants were assigned to one of the three conditions at random, and
participation was broadly equal.
Category Response Study% Facebook%
Gender Male 33 43.6
Female 66 46.3
Age 18-24 72.3 20.5
25-34 21.8 24.7
35-44 7 17.9
45-54 2 14.2
55+ 0 13.7
Education High School 3 20
Undergraduate de-
gree
66.3 32.1
Postgraduate degree 31.7 3.6
Table 5.2: Comparison of demographics in our study to those of Facebook in the UK.
Demographics are derived from data made available to Facebook advertisers, correct as
of January 2015.
154 people began the study, of whom 109 completed participation in the
first week. 71 of these participants also completed the second part of the study
a week later. As shown in Table 5.1, participation was broadly equal across all
three conditions. In our analysis, we consider the responses of all 109 parti-
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cipants, with only those who completed both weeks considered in our temporal
analysis of the robustness of contextual integrity. Table 5.2 shows the demo-
graphics of our sample population, compared to data Facebook make available
to their advertisers.1 As 77.2% of our participants live in the UK, we compare
our sample to the UK’s demographic make-up. A side-effect of primarily pro-
moting the study in university mailing lists is that we oversample younger,
university-educated people. In our results, we did not find any significant re-
lationships between willingness to share data and these demographic factors.
5.2.1 Evaluating the norms dataset
The effectiveness of using contextual integrity to reduce the burden of acquir-
ing informed consent is incumbent on the quality of the social norms that we
calculate. The 2012 dataset used for this similarly oversampled undergradu-
ate students and so is suitable for comparison. To observe how behaviour has
changed in the two years before this 2014 study, we compare the amount of
data shared by participants in our secured consent condition to those in the 2012
dataset. We isolate these participants as they were asked the full set of possible
questions, without norm conformity being used to remove questions from the
set. Figure 5.1 shows that participants in our study are much more willing to
share data than in 2012. For all data types, willingness to share is greater than
in 2012, although in both sets, willingness to share photos and photo albums
is lower. We believe the high variability in willingness to share photo albums
is because some participants interpret this as sharing the album and all pho-
tos within, while others consider it to only be sharing knowledge of the album,
which would result in the exposure of much less data. While our study does not
address the cause of this trend towards increased sharing, it may be due to the
increased adoption of SNSs, and the sharing of content on these services.
1Facebook Ads Manager: facebook.com/advertising
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5.2.2 Is there a relationship between burden and accuracy?
We are interested in the relationship between burden – the percentage of poten-
tial questions a participant is asked about their willingness to share data with
researchers, and accuracy – whether inferences based on these questions satisfy
the expectations of the individual.
As discussed earlier, participants in the secured consent condition were not
asked any questions about their willingness to share individual pieces of data,
representing a burden of 0%. Conversely, participants in the sustained consent
condition were asked whether they were willing to share each individual piece
of data collected in the study, a potential burden of 100%. For users in the con-
textual integrity condition, we expected burden to lie somewhere in the middle.
In the worst case, the burden would match that of sustained consent, however
the more norm-conformant a participant was, the fewer questions they were
asked.
We expected that participants in the sustained consent condition would yield
the highest accuracy. As these participants were explicitly asked about their
willingness to share each piece of data, the acquisition of these data should
meet their expectations. Conversely, we expected the secured consent condition
to exhibit lower, and more variable accuracy. As this method does not account
for differences between participants’ willingness to share data, it is unlikely to
meet most people’s expectations.
Figure 5.4 shows the relationship between burden and accuracy in all three
conditions. As expected, participants in the sustained consent condition mostly
saw perfect accuracy. While secured consent does indeed exhibit the most vari-
able accuracy, it performs better than we originally anticipated; we discuss the
implications of this later.
Behaviour in the contextual integrity condition is more variable. While there
is a similar tendency towards higher accuracy, there is a notable drop in per-
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Figure 5.4: Scatterplot showing the relationship between accuracy and burden in all
three conditions. Accuracy is the most variable for those in the secured consent con-
dition, whereas in the case of contextual integrity, a small loss in accuracy is met with
a greater time burden saving. Note that the points have been jittered to improve read-
ability.
103
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Conforms Deviates Undetermined
Condition
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Figure5.5: Boxplot showing how accuracy differs between participants in the contexutal
integrity condition depending on their norm conformity. Norm-conformant people
achieve higher, and less variable, accuracy rates than those who deviate from norms.
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formance. As shown, surprisingly accuracy drops with increased burden. This
exposes an important detail about the applicability of the contextual integrity
method. When we expand this condition to show the accuracy of participants
based on their norm conformity, this trend is easier to understand. The tech-
nique attempts to detect the norm deviance and conformity of participants. As
shown in Figure 5.5, the former was not useful for maximising accuracy. As
deviance requires more questions to detect, this drags down overall accuracy
as burden increases. In addition, this highlights that where norm conformity
was identified, accuracy improved slightly compared to those whose conformity
could not be determined, with the exception of one outlier. Later in this section
we discuss the implications of contextual integrity better serving certain types
of people.
When combining responses from all conditions, a one-way ANOVA shows no
statistically significant effect of burden on accuracy (F(1, 171) = 0.903,p > 0.1),
suggesting that as people’s behaviour is so diverse, improving the accuracy of
consent acquisition simply through increasing the number of interventionsmay
not be sufficient.
5.2.3 Does contextual integrity reduce participant burden?
We use contextual integrity in the consent process to determine if people con-
form to social norms, and leverage this conformity to ask fewer questions about
their willingness to share data. Participants in the sustained consent and con-
textual integrity conditions were asked a maximum of 100 questions.2 In the
contextual integrity condition questions were not asked if the participant was
found to be norm-conformant or deviant with respect to a particular data type.
On average, participants in the sustained condition were asked 81.9 questions,
while contextual integrity participants were asked 67.2, a 21.9% decrease in
burden. When comparing the distribution of burden between the two condi-
2For some participants, this number was smaller in practice if they did not have enough pieces
of data in their Facebook profile of each type.
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Figure 5.6: In all three conditions, median accuracy is high, although variability in-
creases as the number of questions asked is reduced.
tions, a one-way ANOVA shows a statistically significant difference (F(1, 122) =
25.15,p < 0.05). This significant reduction is useful when conducting longit-
udinal studies, as it suggests the technique may allow fewer disruptive inter-
ventions to acquire consent. This finding is only useful, however, if accuracy is
not compromised.
5.2.4 Does contextual integrity signiﬁcantly reduce accuracy?
In all conditions, mean accuracy is very high, only dropping from 99.3% in the
sustained condition, to 92.7% in the contextual integrity case, and 91.2% for
secured consent. Accuracy is most variable in the contextual integrity and se-
cured conditions, as depicted in Figure 5.6. Surprisingly, median accuracy in the
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secured consent condition is close to 100%, suggesting a large proportion of the
sample were willing to share all of their data with researchers. While identi-
fying the motivations for this are beyond the scope of this study, the study
from which the 2012 norms are derived similarly found that people are more
willing to share social network data with academic researchers depending on
the purpose of the study [88]. As expected, variability for contextual integrity
participants lies between the two extremes of the other conditions. Despite
the similarly high medians, an ANOVA comparing accuracy between the con-
textual integrity and sustained conditions suggests that the former exhibits a
significantly lower accuracy distribution, failing one of our performance met-
rics (F(1, 120) = 7.45,p < 0.05) The plurality of a high accuracy cluster, and
very low-performing outliers merits further explanation, and goes some way
to explaining this apparent failure.
5.2.5 Who does contextual integritywork for?
We classify participants in the contextual integrity condition based on their
norm conformity. Figure 5.8 shows the time taken to determine which of these
groups participants belong to. If a participant is norm-conformant, in the vast
majority of cases this is identified within just 7 questions per attribute, allowing
us to skip all further questions and use this conformity as a proxy for their
willingness to share discrete items. Figure 5.7 illustrates how this purging
of questions for norm-conformant and deviant participants affects accuracy,
indicating the types of user that the contextual integrity technique can support.
The technique used to detect norm conformity requires a person to agree to
share at least 5 pieces of data before being able to calculate whether or not
they conform to the norm. The large cluster of green points here with high
accuracy indicates that people who are norm-conformant can be asked a small
number of questions while maintaining accuracy. Indeed, when questions are
removed at this point, the technique performs better than for people whose
conformity could not be established (and for whomno questions were removed),
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Figure 5.7: Scatterplot showing the relationship between norm conformity and accur-
acy. As indicated by the cluster after 5 questions (5% burden), high accuracy can be
preserved when norm conformity is detected quickly, although the technique is not
useful for people who are highly norm deviant. Note that the points have been jittered
to improve readability.
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Figure 5.8: Cumulative distribution function of the number of questions needed to de-
termine whether participants in the contextual integrity condition conform or deviate
from the norm, or if this could not be determined. If people conform to norms, this is
detected after a small number of interventions.
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suggesting that people who behave similarly to their peers can be asked fewer
questions and achieve higher accuracy. Users who are norm-deviant often need
to answer more questions, with deviance detected within 15 to 20 questions.
We found, however, that removing questions for norm-deviant participants
actually hurt accuracy. A very small number of participants behaved in such
a way that deviance-detection was employed, but the poor performance of this
technique has excluded using it in future applications of the technique.
27.7% of participants’ conformity was detected within 6 questions while
achieving more than 96.5% accuracy, the intercept with the undetermined re-
gression line at this point, while on average achieving a 41.1% reduction in
burden, indicating that for such people, contextual integrity achieves both a re-
duction in burden and an increase in accuracy relative to the sustained condition.
This is an important result, as although it indicates that contextual integrity is
not be appropriate for all people, within just 6 questions we can detect whether
a user’s consent can be accurately captured, and apply an appropriate strategy
based on their behaviour. Based on the slope of the regression lines, we can
determine best practices for application of the contextual integrity technique.
If a person’s norm conformity can be detected within 6 questions, then trusting
this as a proxy for their explicit consent performs very well. We also determ-
ined whether participants were significantly norm-deviant. That is, if their
behaviour significantly deviated from the social norms, we would also remove
questions and take their current sharing ratios as a proxy for willingness to
share. We found that this approach does not perform well, as deviance requires
at least 15 interventions to determine, and is a very low-performing proxy. As
such, if people are significantly deviant from social norms, it is best to continue
asking them questions to maintain high accuracy.
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Figure 5.9: Boxplot showing how robust each condition is to temporal change by us-
ing the consent policy from the first week to predict the participant’s responses in
the second week. All conditions exhibit over-sharing, highlighting the difficulty of
capturing consent at a single point in time.
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5.2.6 Is contextual integrity robust to temporal changes inwill-
ingness to share?
Attitudes towards privacy and sharing social network data are temporally volat-
ile, and as such, decisions about willingness to share data with researchers may
only represent thinking at a single point in time, and not a person’s “true” in-
tent. As discussed in Chapter 2.1, this may cause regret, and perceived leakage
of social network data. The consent methods we examine in this study consider
the temporal issue differently. The secured consent method, perhaps the most
common in social network studies, assumes that a participant’s willingness to
participate in a study is carte blanche to collect any data associated with them,
and disregards any temporal effects. Conversely, sustained consent relies on
constant interventions to mitigate any drift in a person’s willingness to share
data, which achieves high accuracy at the cost of a significant burden on the
participant. As a goal of the contextual integrity method is to reduce the bur-
den on participants, we hypothesise that leveraging social norms is more robust
over time. If a user is found to highly conform to social norms at one point in
time, we expect this to hold true as a proxy for willingness to share discrete
pieces of data. As we have discussed earlier, we expected a small decrease in
accuracy compared to sustained consent as the significant number of interven-
tions ensures accuracy. By repeating the study over a week, we capture changes
in behaviour to determine the robustness of these techniques. To do this, we
apply the consent policy of the first week’s results to predict the participant’s
responses in the second week. These predictions are validated by the parti-
cipant’s responses to the performance evaluation questionnaire, just as how ac-
curacy is measured. Figure 5.9 illustrates the extent to which these predictions
would have led to over-sharing of data. These results suggest that privacy atti-
tudes do indeed change over the course of a week. Across all conditions, trying
to use predictions from the previous week performs quite poorly in many cases.
This is most problematic in the case of secured consent because there is no way
of accommodating such changes in intent, suggesting that consent acquisition
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in a single moment in time is not sufficient. The sustained consent condition
shows a very similar distribution, however in practice this would be mitigated
by continuing to intervene to capture consent, dismissing the need to rely on
old data, at the cost of higher participant burden. Surprisingly, the contextual
integrity condition performs poorly by this measure of robustness, however
this is understandable in the context of our previous result that the technique
is only applicable for about a quarter of the population who are highly norm-
conformant, and an ANOVA suggests over-sharing is not significantly higher
in this case (F(2,65) = 0.168,p > 0.1). As this condition includes participants of
varying degrees of conformity, attempts to leverage this to make longitudinal
predictions for non-conformant participants performs very poorly. In practice,
users who have not been identified themselves as norm-conformant within 6
interventions would be excluded from a contextual integrity-based solution in
favour of a sustained consent approach that would better capture their intent.
Returning to our hypotheses, we find qualified support for H1. On average,
contextual integrity reduces burden by 21.9%. While median accuracy is not
significantly better than secured consent, for 27.7% of participants, contextual
integrity delivered perfect accuracy with a 41.1% reduction in burden compared
to the sustained condition. We also find support for H2, as the contextual in-
tegrity method is not significantly less robust than sustained consent over time.
We note that as human behaviour is so diverse, there is no “one-size-fits-
all” approach to consent that achieves optimal results. A benefit of the method
we introduce is that as norm conformity can be quickly established, if a person
clearly does not conform to such norms, it is possible to transparently change
strategy to a sustained approach and maximise accuracy. We found that while
the low-burden secured consent approach may be sufficient for some people, it
can not be relied on to maintain accuracy in most cases.
We acknowledge that our measure of accuracy is not the sole means to de-
termine that informed consent has been sought. This metric allows us to con-
firm that the participant disclosed the SNS data that they were willing to, which
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we believe is important to establish. It does not, however, determine whether
the participant understands the implications of sharing their data, or the pur-
pose of the research. In biomedical studies, consent comprehension tests are
commonly used to determine that participants’ consent is informed, but their
effectiveness has been questioned [17]. Investigating the wider implications of
assessing consent comprehension is important further work, where again we
anticipate contextual integrity could be leveraged. For example, while we found
that our semi-automated approach to determining consent was appropriate for
some people, others might find it invasive, and striking this ethical balance is
a sensitive topic.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the first application of contextual integ-
rity to the acquisition of informed consent for sharing SNS data. We note the
following:
• Contextual integrity can be leveraged to reduce the burden placed on par-
ticipants to acquire consent on average by 21.9%.
• For 27.7% of participants who are highly conformant to social norms, con-
textual integrity can deliver accuracy paralleling that of burdensome sus-
tained consent, while reducing burden by 41.1% compared to the sustained
condition.
• Using norm conformity to determine consent is temporally robust over a
week, but further work is needed to determine whether this holds true for
longer periods.
Having shown how we can apply contextual integrity to a framework for
studying SNSs, and demonstrating that it can constitute an appropriate means
of acquiring informed consent in SNS studies, in the next chapter we consider
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how the framework can be applied to the study of emerging SNSs, to examine
their potential privacy impacts.
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Chapter 6
Identifyingprivacybreaches inemer-
ging SNSswith contextual integrity
In this chapter, we demonstrate how contextual integrity can be used as a dia-
gnostic to determine the potential privacy impacts of emerging SNSs. We con-
duct a user study to investigate the potential risks when adding financial in-
centives to LBSNs.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We conduct the first application of contextual integrity to identify the
norms governing the use of incentivised location sharing systems.
• We conduct a user study of 22 smartphone users to understand expecta-
tions and motivations in an incentivised location sharing system, and to
see whether feedback affects willingness to disclose locations.
The rise of smartphones and mobile sensing smart devices is enabling vast
amounts of personal data to be collected or generated, and optionally shared
with other people, services, and businesses, as we discussed in Chapter 2.2.
Such self-tracking is the logical extension of context-sharing applications such
as Foursquare. Such services are increasingly delivering financial incentives to
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encourage people to act as an advertising agent on behalf of a business to their
social network. The introduction of incentives raises several questions. Do they
affect privacy concerns, or people’s uses of such services? Do people’s decisions
change for the worse as a result of incentives, and how, or indeed should, we
improve this? In this section, we look at ILS services (Chapter 2.2), to determine
whether theymay constitute a risk to individual privacy. While the use of LBSNs
has been well studied, this is the first user study to examine the potential risks
in embedding financial incentives in traditionally social-driven online sharing.
To determine whether incentives may introduce new privacy violations, we
use Nissenbaum’s model of contextual integrity, introduced in Chapter 2.3.6.
Specifically, we use the contextual integrity decision heuristic, a diagnostic tool
for determining whether a new process risks violating the expectations within
an entrenched context, as described in Chapter 2.3.6. We discuss a preliminary
user study in which 22 people use an ILS application for one week, and receive
financial incentives to share their location with businesses and their social net-
work. The user study allows us to better understand the expectations of people
using such an application, their behaviour and motivations for disclosing their
location for a financial incentive, and how the design of the application affects
how people use it. We use these findings to complete the decision heuristic and
decide whether ILS constitutes a privacy violation. In addition, we recommend
a number of best practices for application developers, to provide services that
deliver incentives for disclosures in a way that preserves people’s comfort and
privacy, while delivering benefits to advertisers and developers.
This study aims to address the following research questions:
1. Do users of LBSNs have different expectations of privacy when their dis-
closures are financially motivated?
2. Do incentives perturb privacy norms in an LBSN to the extent that con-
textual integrity is violated?
3. Does greater transparency about the flow of personal information when
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users share their location for money affect behaviour, and reduce the risk
of privacy violations?
6.1 Applying the decision heuristic to ILS
As introduced in Chapter 2.3.6, the first stage of the decision heuristic requires
the understanding of information flows through the application in question. We
therefore first examine Quidco, one of the commercial ILS services described in
Chapter 2.2. This application allows users to share their location with their
social network, with the addition of a financial incentive provided to the user
whenever they disclose their patronage at a participating business, who in re-
turn receive some personal information about the user 1. We now step through
the decision heuristic in turn.
The first six steps of Nissenbaum’s nine step heuristic allow us to identify
whether ILS systems generate changes in the transmission principles present
in the location-sharing context, raising an immediate “red flag” as violating
entrenched informational norms. This prima facie assessment about the poten-
tial privacy impacts of this transformed context motivates further exploration
of the context, without considering the wider moral factors [100] beyond the
scope of this study. This assessment is informed, where possible, by previous
work that has identified the expectations, behaviours, motivations, and norms
of the location-sharing context, although we identify the aspects of the ILS
context not yet studied, which we capture in this user study. We structure our
analysis in the same vein as Jones and Janes’ application of contextual integrity
to Google Books [59].
1Quidco Privacy Policy: http://www.quidco.com/privacy-policy
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6.1.1 Information ﬂows
The first step in applying the decision heuristic is to identify the flows of in-
formation that manifest in the context. In an ILS service, there are three
primary information flows during use of the application:
• A user’s identity and location is disclosed to the provider of the ILS service
so it may return context-appropriate adverts to display to the user.
• If the user checks in to any of the locations advertised, some personal
information is disclosed to the relevant advertiser.
• When checking in, a user’s location data may be disclosed to their social
network on a service such as Facebook or Twitter.
Nested contexts
ILS systems, as with many other LBSNs, disclose location data to other SNSs,
which facilitate further engagement around the location disclosure, such as
commenting or soliciting “likes”. Therefore, we consider the SNS a nested
context, subject to its own entrenched norms, although we do not consider this
in detail in this analysis. There is a risk of impacts from these contexts, partic-
ularly where the expectations associated with the LBSN do not align with those
of the SNS. Users may exhibit boundary regulating behaviours on the LBSN in-
dependently of the SNS, and where these do not align, a privacy violation may
occur [104]. We do not expect the introduction of an incentivised components
to LBSNs to dramatically alter the incidence of these collisions.
6.1.2 Information subjects, senders, and recipients
When discussing the flows of information, we must consider who is responsible
for sending and receiving information, and to whom the information relates
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(the subject).
In the ILS context, the subject of the information is the system’s users. The
flows of information within the context are designed to enable the disclosure
of locations by these users to their social network, and the disclosure of some
personal information in exchange for a financial incentive.
The senders of information are the users whenever they request relevant ad-
verts from a set of advertisers, or disclose their location to their social network
and PII to an advertiser.
The recipients are the advertiser, when they receive a request for advertise-
ments, and when they learn the identity of a user who has checked in to their
business. In addition, the user’s social network, and the provider of the ILS
service, receive identifiable location updates from the user.
6.1.3 Information attributes
Information attributes refer to the types of information shared within a context.
When a user initially registers with the ILS service, they provide PII such
as their name and email address, as well as demographic information of likely
value to advertisers such as their age.
Users transmit their current location and a personal identifier to the service
provider in order to receive location-specific adverts. The service provider uses
the identifier to authenticate and log the user’s activity, and the user’s coordin-
ates are used to find relevant advertisers. At this point, there is no sharing of
PII with an individual advertiser.
When a user checks in to a location, their identity and patronage at that
location is disseminated to their social network, or delegated to another SNS
to increase its reach. In the case of Facebook, this is transformed into a status
update, outlining the name and location of the business the user is visiting,
121
and a current timestamp. In addition, the user’s identity is disclosed to the
relevant advertiser, who delivers a financial incentive to the user. The provider
of the mobile advertising system may also deliver demographic information to
the advertiser to assist their advertising targeting practices.
6.1.4 Transmission principles
Transmission principles are the rules that govern people’s information sharing
in a particular context, and are a critical aspect of any context-relative in-
formational norm. In an LBSN, as in other SNSs, disclosures are motivated by
impression management and to build social capital, without an expectation of
reciprocity, as discussed in Chapter 2.1. Disclosures to the social network are
generally accompanied by an expectation of confidentiality, in so much as users
would not expect the location to be relayed to an audience beyond their social
network. The provider of the LBSN is trusted to not sell or otherwise share
these data to third parties.
We do not have an exhaustive understanding, however, of all the transmis-
sion principles that manifest in the ILS context. We might expect that location-
sharing transmission principles may apply to some extent, as incentivised loc-
ation disclosures are made in much the same way as in a traditional LBSN. In
the ILS context, however, where users receive a financial incentive for their dis-
closures, different transmission principles may emerge. The additional flow of
PII to advertisers may introduce new data protection requirements, depending
on jurisdiction, or regulations governing the handling of marketing data. The
extent to which users appreciate these differences when deciding to disclose
their location data is unknown. In addition to the social motivations outlined
earlier, we also do not know whether financially-incentivised users have dif-
ferent expectations about when their social network should be able to access
their location, or how they should consume this information, with the context
of requests for location data identified as a common concern in Chapter 2.2.
122
We hypothesise that the ILS context may perturb some of these principles,
by introducing a financial, rather than social, motivation for disclosing loca-
tions. The myriad unknown transmission principles motivate a user study in
which we examine motivations for sharing and withholding location data, and
how the design of an ILS application can affect the incidence of these motiv-
ations. We need to additionally capture users’ expectations of how their data
are transmitted to other parties. The prevailing motivations and expectations
will constitute our set of transmission principles. If this set is significantly
divergent from motivations identified in the location-sharing literature, this
may constitute an unacceptable departure from the norms established in the
location-sharing context.
6.1.5 Entrenched informational norms
Entrenched informational norms describe the existing sets of practices that
prevail in a given context, encompassing the flows of information and expect-
ations of the actors involved.
The ILS context inherits the entrenched norms governing location sharing,
specifically the same context, senders, subjects, and attributes of information.
The significant points of departure involve the introduction of new recipients
of information and transmission principles.
As in a traditional LBSN, ILS users disclose their own location selectively to
their social network. While an LBSN motivates disclosure through perceived
social benefit, ILS augments this by introducing a financial incentive for dis-
closing certain locations. The substance of the location disclosure is the same,
but some personally identifiable information is provided to the owner of the
business whenever this happens, in return for the financial incentive. The
introduction of this additional exchange of information is conflated with the
social benefit of the location disclosure, so it is not known to what extent a dis-
closure was motivated by traditional location-sharing norms of building social
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capital, or the financial incentive, and how willingness to disclose is reduced
by concerns about sharing personal identifiable information with a commercial
third-party.
In an LBSN, the user directly controls the disclosure of their location, and is
able to review the content and audience of this disclosure on the social network
site to which it was published. This is maintained in the ILS context, however
some personal information is also disclosed to an advertiser, without similar
in situ feedback. In our user study, we explore whether different degrees of
transparency about secondary use of personal identifiable information affects
willingness and motivations for sharing. Through the lens of contextual integ-
rity, we will determine whether some of these disclosures may be considered
inappropriate, if the user’s mental model of the flows of information is not re-
conciled with reality, and if the addition of an incentive significantly increases
disclosure rates without a clear understanding of the implications of such dis-
closures.
Table 6.1 summarises the steps of the decision heuristic. As shown, while
we are able to comprehensively illustrate the fundamental aspects of the ILS
context, we do not know all the transmission principles, particularly the ex-
pectations of users regarding how their information is used. Our user study
allows us to identify these transmission principles and complete the decision
heuristic. In this study, we focus on the steps needed to render a prima facie
assessment regarding a potential breach of contextual integrity. Steps 7 and 8
invite an in-depth study of the wider moral and political factors, and the ex-
tent to which these factors impinge on the values and goals of the context. We
choose not to examine these factors in this work as they are dependent on this
initial assessment having been made.
This initial analysis shows that an ILS service constitutes an extension of
the norms within an existing LBSN, as a user’s interaction with the system,
the actors, and information flows are largely inherited from a social-driven
LBSN. The introduction of financial incentives itself does not affect the flow of
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Step Whatwe know
1. Information flows
• Location disclosure to platform operator
• PII disclosure to advertiser
• Location disclosure to social network
2. Prevailing context Location-sharing services
3. a) Subject Users’ PII and disclosed locations
b) Senders Users
c) Recipients Users’ social network and advertisers
4. Transmission principles To be identified in user study
5. Entrenched informa-
tional norms
• Location disclosures are voluntary
• Disclosures try to build social capital
6. Prima facie assessment To be made after user study
7. Moral and political
factors
Out of scope in this study
8. Impingement on con-
textual values
Out of scope in this study
9. Recommend for or
against the practice
Initial recommendation to be made after user study
Table 6.1: A summary of Nissenbaum’s decision heuristic, showing what we know at
each step prior to the user study.
information, but may affect the motivations for disclosures. This in turn may
constitute a violation of privacy if people’s mental models are not sufficiently
adapted to this adjusted context.
6.1.6 Method
To complete Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity decision heuristic, we conduc-
ted a week-long user study with 22 participants, designed to identify the pre-
vailing norms and expectations necessary to determine whether ILS constitutes
a prima facie violation of contextual integrity. We chose to run the study for
seven days based on recommendations from the experience sampling literat-
ure [47] and from running such studies in the past.
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Figure 6.1: Screenshot of the incentivised location sharing application created for our
user study. One group of participants are shown information about the flow of PII
before confirming a check-in.
For this user study, we developed an application for Android smartphones
that closely resembled the interface and feature-set of existing commercial ap-
plications such as Quidco and Foursquare. The application consisted of a widget
that used the Google Places API to periodically update and display the names
of businesses close to the participant’s current location. From the widget, the
participant could select a nearby business and check in, thus creating a Face-
book status update, in exchange for a small financial incentive. At the start of
the study, participants chose six of their Facebook friends who would be able to
view these stories, representing a cross-section of close friends, acquaintances,
and colleagues. By choosing a small subset of people to share locations with,
we mitigate potential adverse effects of over-sharing in the study, considering
our interest in potentially inappropriate disclosures, while still making par-
ticipants consider the social impact of their disclosures to a diverse audience.
Participants could pause the application for a short period of time if they did
not want location data to be collected.
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Study design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, which affected
the feedback displayed to participants immediately before they checked in, and
the value of the cash incentive. These conditions were:
• Low incentive, no feedback (LowNo): Participants received £0.10 for each
check-in, and were not actively reminded that PII would be disclosed to
the business.
• High incentive, no feedback (HighNo): Participants received £0.20 for each
check-in, and were not actively reminded that PII would be disclosed to
the business.
• High incentive, feedback (HighYes): Participants received £0.20 for each
check-in, and were reminded that their name and age would be disclosed
to the business.
Participants in the HighYes condition were shown the information depicted
in Figure 6.1, while other participants were only informed that their check-ins
would be disclosed to their Facebook friends before checking in. These in-
centive levels were chosen based on the distribution of incentives we find in
commercial applications such as Quidco. The high incentive level was set at
£0.20 because we were interested in seeing whether differences would mani-
fest even between marginally different levels of micro-incentives, and to avoid
compelling lower-income participants to check in out of financial need, which
we are not investigating in this study. Participants were not told that there
were other conditions, nor how the incentives were chosen.
Before joining the study, all participants were asked to read the applica-
tion’s privacy policy, which specified that the business indicated would receive
some PII in return for the financial incentive. Our feedback conditions aimed to
determine whether increased visibility of this sensitive information flow sig-
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nificantly affected willingness to check in, and the motivations for completing
a check-in.
Before beginning to use the application, participants completed a pre-briefing
questionnaire, consisting of 15 questions drawn from the ‘collection’, ‘control’,
‘awareness’, and ‘secondary use’ dimensions of the Internet Users’ Information
Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale [82]. To these we added a question identifying
expectations in the ILS context. This questionnaire is shown in full in Ap-
pendix C. We did not include questions pertaining to the ‘errors’, ‘improper
access’, or ‘global information privacy concerns’ dimensions as they were tan-
gential to this study. Immediately after completing the study, participants were
asked to complete the same questionnaire, allowing us to identify a relationship
between different feedback conditions and a change in privacy attitudes.
The application was instrumented to record all completed check-ins, and
abandoned check-ins (when the participant accesses the check-in interface,
shown in Figure 6.1, but does not complete a check-in). In addition to re-
cording the participant’s activity during their seven days of participation, par-
ticipants received an automatically-generated end-of-day questionnaire each
night, based on their activity during the preceding day. This allowed us to cap-
ture qualitative data about the motivations for activity within the application,
and to clean anomalous outliers (such as accidental interface taps) within hours
of the activity occurring.
Recruitment
Participants were recruited through advertisements on Facebook, mailing lists
aimed at university students and staff, and viral messaging on social networks
such as Twitter and Facebook. Participants were not screened, with the only
requirement being possession of an Android smartphone and a Facebook ac-
count. 39 participants were recruited in total, of whom 22 completed, and 17
prematurely left the study. The majority of those who did not complete the
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study installed the application to their mobile device but did not complete the
registration and consent process. 9 participants were in the LowNo condition,
6 in the HighNo condition, and 7 in the HighYes condition. To reduce the im-
pact of cultural differences in privacy expectations, we recruited all participants
from the United Kingdom. Recruitment for the experiment positioned our sys-
tem as a new commercial application, to closely align participant expectations
with that of existing commercial applications.
Ethical considerations
Due to the sensitivity of the location data collected during the study, and the
deception employed, we took care to ensure the experiment was conducted in an
ethical manner. While participants were told that some personal information
would be disclosed to advertisers, no such disclosure occurred, and location
data were only transmitted to the system to allow the application to generate
relevant adverts.
Data collection used our PRISONER framework for privacy-sensitive hand-
ling of social network data, which we introduced in Chapter 4. The study made
limited use of Facebook, with the need to retrieve the names of the participant’s
Facebook friends to allow them to choose which would receive location disclos-
ures, and the limited ability to publish these disclosures to Facebook. A policy
was written that allowed the names of the participant’s friends to be tempor-
arily retrieved so this could be displayed to the participant, and the friends’
user IDs were stored so that the visibility of disclosures could be restricted to
them. This raised a design limitation of PRISONER’s current policy language.
It is possible to place constraints on the retrieval and storage of SNS data, but
in this situation, a distinction between the storage of data for the execution of
the experiment, and storage for the benefit of the researcher would be useful.
For example, although we need to store the user IDs of friends to restrict the
audience of location disclosures, the collection of these data is not relevant to
our interests. The current policy language, however, would allow us to access
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these data anyway. Although not developed for this experiment, this has high-
lighted the need to make our policy language more expressive, to allow data to
be stored and sanitised securely without providing the researcher direct access
to it, if such access is not necessary.
The deception within the experimental design was handled sensitively. As
per best practice [12], all participants were informed of the deception after the
study closed in an email providing their remuneration, explaining the motiv-
ation for the study, and participants were given the opportunity to ask any
further questions about how the experiment was conducted.
Participants were told they would earn money for sharing their locations.
Rather than provide the exact amount promised by the application, all parti-
cipants were given an Amazon voucher of equal value at the end of the study,
surpassing the value any participant accrued during normal use of the applic-
ation. This strategy was employed due to ethical concerns about financially
rewarding some participants more than others.
The experimental design and all recruitment materials were approved by our
ethics committee.
6.1.7 Results
In total, our 22 participants completed 212 check-ins, abandoned 471, and the
most active user checked in 15 times in one day. Before completing the decision
heuristic, we examine the overall differences between our groups of participants
to understand the effects of our feedback and incentive conditions.
Less feedback induces greater sharing
Figure 6.2 shows the proportion of completed check-ins and abandoned check-
ins. We hypothesise that users who were offered more money would check-in
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Figure 6.2: Participants who receive higher incentives but no additional feedback
(HighNo) check in more often, whereas those given feedback about PII flows (HighYes)
check in the least often.
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more often (H1), unless more feedback was shown about how their personal
information would be used (H3).
We found that participants in the HighNo condition exhibited the most vari-
able behaviour. A number of participants performedmore check-ins than lower-
paid participants, but this was not consistent across the group. A one-way AN-
OVA shows no significant differences in the overall rate of check-ins [F(2, 13) =
0.807,p > 0.05], so we can not accept H1. This is not surprising, as users did
not know that other participants were being offered different sums of money,
therefore the distinction between ‘low’ and ‘high’ incentives is more subjective
than the arbitrary values we selected for this study.
We did, however, note a reduction in disclosure rates for participants in the
HighYes condition, where most users only completed less than 10% of check-
ins. Behaviour was the most consistent within this group, and the higher
variance among non-feedback groups indicates that the absence of such feed-
back generally induced more sharing. Although overall numbers of abandoned
check-ins were not significantly different between groups [F(2, 13) = 0.596,p >
0.05], those who received more feedback abandoned more relative to the num-
ber of completed check-ins. We note that higher incentives without feedback
is associated with greater variance in check-in rates, indicating an influence on
behaviour. Some participants in all conditions did not complete any check-ins
throughout the study, despite continuing to interact with the application.
Feedbackmay engender support for ILS
Figure 6.3 shows the results of the IUIPC survey before and after the study.
Participants exposed to more feedback about the flow of PII during the study
reported greater agreement on most dimensions in our post-brief survey, par-
ticularly “secondary use” (concern about information being used for reasons
not originally sanctioned), “control” (loss of control leads to privacy violation),
and “awareness” (of privacy practices), however this increase is not statistic-
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ally significant. This is consistent with our expectations, as participants in this
condition were provided with more information about how their information
would be used, but were not provided with additional tools for managing this
flow, other than not using the application. Participants in low feedback condi-
tions did not significantly alter their responses in the debrief questionnaire.
We found that participants who received less feedback were less comfortable
with ILS at the end of the study, although we saw increased comfort with ILS
services for those in the higher feedback conditions, represented by the greater
positive tendency for this question in Figure 6.3. This is surprising, as we
expected those receiving a higher material benefit to feel more affinity for the
practice as they agree that businesses are entitled to personal information in
exchange for money. Participants in both high incentive conditions reported
greater concern about secondary use of their PII, a fundamental aspect of ILS,
while lower-paid participants’ concern did not change as much. This suggests
neither incentives nor feedback significantly impact people’s concern about the
use of their information.
Our examination of attitudes before and after the study reveals that concern
and awareness of privacy issues generally increases through participating in
the study. Interestingly, only participants who were provided feedback about
the flows of their information believed that ILS was a more legitimate prac-
tice than at the start of the study, while confidence in ILS dropped for our
other participants. This mirrors our finding that high feedback participants are
much more comfortable with the disclosure of their PII. We believe this can
be attributed to a combination of such participants feeling more empowered
by the transparent explanation of how their information is used, while other
participants, without the same in situ assurances, may have exhibited a prim-
ing effect from the study being bookended by our IUIPC questionnaire. Parti-
cipants did not frequently report such concerns in our end-of-day question-
naires, lending further support to this theory.
These results give us some insight into the expectations of people before
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adopting an ILS service, and their values after having experienced such a sys-
tem. We observe paradoxical results, with participants’ general privacy con-
cerns hardened, but their attitudes towards ILS more relaxed. Contextual in-
tegrity suggests if a new process perturbs the values of an existing context,
there is a risk of privacy breaches. This appears to manifest in our results, as
people are reporting greater concern, yet appear to be placated by the introduc-
tion of a financial incentive. Failure to reconcile these behaviours risks people
feeling compelled to make disclosures they might otherwise consider inappro-
priate. Our analysis of the IUIPC study indicates that theremay be a relationship
between exposure to feedback and people’s privacy attitudes, but further work
is needed to assess the significance of this effect.
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Figure 6.4: The frequency of self-reported motivations for checking in to our system.
Consistent with other LBSNs, most disclosures were motivated by impression manage-
ment and to build social capital. Participants who received higher incentives (HighNo
and HighYes) would often explicitly promote the businesses they were visiting.
Higher incentives change check-inmotivations
We now examine themotivations for these check-ins and abandoned check-ins.
Understanding the motivations of people using a system provides insight into
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the norms governing people’s expectations for the appropriate flows of inform-
ation. This is critical for identifying the transmission principles in the context,
to see whether feedback and incentives has an effect on people’s expectations.
As discussed in Chapter 2.2, disclosures in traditional LBSNs are often mo-
tivated by attempts to build social capital, and this was a recurring theme in
our study too. When asked in end-of-day questionnaires to explain why they
checked in to certain locations, participants in all conditions frequently repor-
ted “wanting my friends to see that I was there”. This motivation did not often
coincide with those directly pertaining to the introduction of incentives, such
as “I don’t mind sharing my personal information in exchange for cash” and
“wanting to promote the business”, which were commonly reported independ-
ently. Interestingly, in 69.2% of cases where social capital was a motivation,
it did not coincide with any other motivations, suggesting people may be mo-
tivated on two largely independent fronts — appealing to their social network,
and promoting businesses for money.
Participants who were offered a higher incentive were more likely to in-
tentionally promote local businesses to their social network. We also find that
when participants cited promotion as a motivation, it coincided with no other
motivation in 57.1% of cases, suggesting that participants treated these two use
cases somewhat independently. Lower-paid participants did not often exhibit
this motivation, suggesting they may have not considered the value of the in-
centive sufficient to deliberately act as an advertising agent for the business,
even if the actual exposure of their check-ins was the same.
Participants who received less feedback cited social capital-building motiv-
ations most often when disclosing their location, suggesting they treated the
service in the same manner as other LBSNs. Similarly, the lowest-paid parti-
cipants were unlikely to cite financial or promotional motivations, suggesting
they also considered the application to be much like any other LBSNs, despite
the additional PII flows our system introduces.
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Identifying transmission principles
Examining motivations reveals that many of the same transmission principles
that have been previously identified in location-sharing applications alsomani-
fest in our ILS service, specifically attempts to build social capital by being pos-
itively associated with certain locations.
Users who received less feedback cited social capital-building motivations
most often when disclosing their location, suggesting they treated the ser-
vice in the same manner as other location-sharing services. Similarly, the
lowest-paid participants were unlikely to cite financial or promotional mo-
tivations, suggesting they also considered the application to be much like any
other location-sharing system, despite the additional PII flows our system in-
troduces.
6.1.8 Implications
Incentivised location sharingmay violate contextual integrity
In order to make a prima facie judgement as to whether ILS risks violating con-
textual integrity, we consider the transmission principles which were absent
from our initial analysis in Chapter 6.1.5, but identified in our user study. Based
on these transmission principles, we make a prima facie judgement that ILS
risks violating contextual integrity, supporting H2, which hypothesises that
incentivised location sharing will perturb norms in the location-sharing con-
text.
Our concern is that the prominence of traditional location-sharing motiva-
tions such as social capital building and impression management, particularly
among users who received less feedback, suggests users are treating the ap-
plication in the samemanner as any other social-driven LBSN, despite sensitive
information being disclosed to advertisers, and the possibility that their social
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network will perceive incentivised check-ins to be of lower value. When users
receive clear feedback about the use of their personal information at the point of
disclosure, they make slightly fewer disclosures, and while disclosures are still
often socially motivated, they often constitute a deliberate effort to advertise
that business to their social network. Current commercial applications often
do not deliver this level of feedback, burying information about the flows of
personal information within unread privacy policies, and we argue that if such
feedback is provided, participants are able to make more informed decisions
about when and why their location will be disclosed. Users who receive more
feedback also report slightly better awareness of online privacy issues.
We do not suggest that the introduction of new motivations for disclosure
themselves constitute a breach of contextual integrity. In our user study, many
participants managed the social and promotional aspects of the ILS context
independent of each other. The relationship between the feedback within the
application, and people’s behaviour and wider attitudes towards online privacy,
suggests the design of such an application can have a significant impact on
people’s relationship with technology. Users who received more feedback about
the flow of PII were the most comfortable with the practice of ILS.
We did not see strong evidence that people felt pressured to disclose their
location for money, or that a desire to earnmoney wasmotivating poor privacy-
preserving behaviours. Therefore, in this prima facie assessment, we do not
believe that ILS represents a major threat to personal autonomy. In our user
study, one participant appeared to game the system by checking in to a wide
variety of locations in an effort to maximise their income, but this behaviour
was unusual.
Our results highlight interesting differences in how feedback and incentives
affect behaviours and motivations in our application, but this preliminary study
has some limitations. Our study is limited to a small number of participants
and levels of incentives, and the impact of demgraphic variables has not been
studied. This work indicates some interesting implications, to be investigated
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and validated in further work.
People value incentives over privacy
Despite high levels of online privacy concern, our results suggest many people
may be comfortable with the notion of disclosing their location and personally
identifiable information for a cash incentive. When our participants were ex-
posed to feedback about the flows of their personal information, their overall
privacy concern increases, but they become even more comfortable with in-
centivised location sharing information flows, believing companies are “en-
titled” to their personal information if they are paid. This result is consistent
with previous findings that people generally value money over their PII [43],
and has implications for further study of ILS. We find that location disclosures
were instigated by a mix of social and financial motivations that often did not
coincide, which may suggest people are attempting to reconcile the context of a
traditional LBSN with ILS. This is cause for concern as, in our system, all loca-
tion disclosures reached the same audience, leading to potentially inappropriate
disclosures to one’s social network. Application designers can address this is-
sue by avoiding the conflation of social and incentivised disclosures through
distinct interfaces for each, and allowing people to choose different audiences
for alternative types of disclosures.
Feedback does not discourage sharing
Participants who received more feedback about the flow of their personal in-
formation were more comfortable with the practice of ILS at the end of the
study, without making a significantly reduced number of location disclosures
compared to other participants. This is an important finding for application
designers to note, as it contradicts any intuition that full disclosure about how
people’s information is used might dissuade users. Rather, our results suggest
our participants may be empowered by understanding how their information is
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used. While they are more discerning about when to share their information,
they are also the most confident that they are aware of the privacy implications
of using such services, and that the disclosure of PII is an appropriate out-
come. Furthermore, the changes in motivations among our participants should
be noted by designers, who ought to design services that satisfy both the social
and financial reasons for their use. Where insufficient feedback was provided,
we were concerned by the conflated motivations for sharing one’s location, as
participants struggled to reconcile the distinct use cases. Among participants
who understood how their personal information was used, however, distinct
social and financial thought processes were observed. Designers should provide
in situ disclosures of how personal information is used, as our results suggests
this satisfies people’s privacy concerns, without severely affecting their will-
ingness to use such services. In addition, incentivised and non-incentivised
disclosures should be represented distinctly, to ensure people’s motivations for
making disclosures are aligned with the exposure of their information.
6.2 Summary
In this chapter, we have applied our framework for conducting SNS studies to
illustrate how contextual integrity can be used to detect potential privacy issues
in emerging SNSs. We note the following:
• In a user study with 22 smartphone owners, we determined that the ad-
dition of incentives to an LBSN may constitute a prima facie violation of
contextual integrity.
• While monetisation does not change the frequency of location disclosures,
people’s motivations for sharing their location are changed, and their pri-
vacy concerns increase.
• Application designers can use feedback to show people how their inform-
ation is used to mitigate concerns, and increase confidence in the practice
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of ILS.
In the next chapter, we consolidate and discuss the implications of the find-
ings we have made in this thesis, and outline directions for further work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Social network sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and location-based social
networks such as Foursquare, have enabled the widespread collection, pro-
cessing, and sharing of sensitive personal information. The nature of these
data exposes people to various privacy risks. Meanwhile, the popularity of such
services is encouraging researchers across many disciplines to study SNSs and
the people who use them, raising ethical concerns about how people’s data are
handled, and whether participants understand the implications of consenting
to such research. We have addressed the following thesis:
Contextual integrity can be used to conduct reproducible and privacy-
preserving experiments using social network sites, and can detect po-
tential privacy violations in new services in order to mitigate their
impact.
To test this, we considered the following questions:
RQ1: Is contextual integrity an appropriate framework for understanding and
mitigating ethical concerns in SNS research?
RQ2: Can contextual integrity be used in the evaluation of SNSs to detect and
mitigate their privacy impacts?
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To address the first question, in Chapter 4 we proposed an architecture for
conducting privacy-preserving SNS studies, informed by contextual integrity.
In Chapter 5 we applied the architecture to investigate consent in SNS stud-
ies, and found that an approach to consent that aims to maintain contextual
integrity was appropriate for many people.
To address the second question, in Chapter 6 we used contextual integrity to
investigate an emerging form of LBSN, to detect whether the addition of fin-
ancial incentives to the existing LBSN context could perturb entrenched norms
and violate privacy. In a user study, we found that the lack of clarity about how
people’s information might be used by advertisers may violate contextual in-
tegrity, and allowed us to identify best practices that could mitigate the impact
of this in future applications.
7.1 Contributions
In Chapter 4, we introduced a framework to conduct privacy-preserving and
reproducible SNS experiments. Its design was informed by the need to up-
hold the contextual integrity of participants, and to support the encoding and
reporting of key methodological details, which in Chapter 3 we found was of-
ten absent in the state of the art. We demonstrated how our architecture met
these requirements by recreating a recent study from the literature, producing
a shareable protocol for the data-collecting practices of the study, and minim-
ising the amount of data available to researchers who implement the protocol
of that study.
In Chapter 5, we investigated a significant methodological challenge: the ac-
quisition of informed consent. Leveraging contextual integrity, we developed
a new method of acquiring consent that aims to reduce the burden of asking
people lots of questions about their willingness to share data, while still captur-
ing their intent. In a user study we found that our method performs very well
for a subset of the population who conform to social norms. The method is able
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to quickly detect norm conformity and switch to an explicit form of gathering
sustained consent if someone does not conform to norms.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we used contextual integrity to examine potential
privacy impacts in an incentivised location sharing system. In a user study
that examined the effects of incentives and feedback on people’s behaviour, we
found that some people over-share their location data when they don’t un-
derstand that additional actors, such as advertisers, may receive personal in-
formation about them in exchange for a financial incentive. The lack of clar-
ity about these new information flows risks violating contextual integrity, as
it perturbs the entrenched norms that already existed in the location-sharing
context, without clearly conveying the impact to users.
7.2 Discussion and furtherwork
In Chapter 4, we proposed a framework for conducting ethical and reproducible
SNS studies. We have demonstrated how we can use the framework to encode
the data collection practices of a previous experiment, producing an artefact
that can be archived or shared with other researchers. As we have argued, this
is an important advance on the state of the art, and enables reproducibility of
SNS experiment workflows, and supports the ethical conduct of studies in a way
no previous tool has allowed. We do acknowledge, however, that this tool is not
a “silver bullet” to resolving ethical and reproducibility challenges. PRISONER
encodes the data collection practices of a study as a policy that can be com-
municated to other stakeholders, such as IRBs or participants, and archived or
shared with other researchers. PRISONER can enforce this policy to restrict
the data available to an experiment, and even if in the future a researcher does
not have access to PRISONER, the human-readable nature of the policy allows
the requirements it encodes to still be upheld. However, PRISONER is not able
to execute an entire experiment with just a policy, which defines constraints
for data collection, but does not encode when or why data are collected. The
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sharing of the code and the environment needed to execute an experiment is
a widely-acknowledged problem that is outwith the scope of this work, and
in Chapter 3.3 we discussed recent work to improve this situation. These solu-
tions, coupled with PRISONER, mitigate some of these challenges. For example,
we can anticipate researchers sharing a virtual machine image that includes the
source code for conducting the experiment and analyses, the operating system
and other environmental dependencies needed to execute the code, including a
PRISONER instance and experiment policies to enforce the constraints on data
collection.
As we acknowledged in Chapter 4.1.7, the design and availability of APIs
provided by SNSs is a significant barrier to reproducibility. We also consider
that PRISONER could evolve to meet this challenge. In the future an archived
experiment image, as we conceived of earlier, could include the original dataset
collected from a particular SNS. Even if the source SNS is no longer available, or
its API has significantly deviated from when the data collection took place, re-
searchers could interrogate the dataset using the original policy and PRISONER
instance to still apply the same constraints to the processing of that dataset.
We also anticipate that a trusted third party could store a repository of datasets
from SNS experiments, and expose a PRISONER API such that other researchers
can conduct privacy-preserving replications of experiments without unfettered
access to the sensitive underlying data.
In this thesis, we have discussed PRISONER’s contribution to improving the
state of reproducibility in SNS research. While our approach allows workflows
to be encoded, shared and reproduced, further work is needed to address con-
cerns about the sustainability and archiving of SNS research. PRISONER could
be expanded to provide an environment that effectively emulates an SNS’s API
at a point in time. Therefore, even if an SNS has long beenmade obsolete, PRIS-
ONER could be used to provide an interface to the underlying data of a previous
experiment, and enforce the same policy.
The design of the PRISONER framework has been informed by its grounding
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in contextual integrity, and shaped by its subsequent application in a number of
studies. This body of work has identified useful extensions to the framework.
Our consent method discussed in Chapter 5 could be integrated into PRISONER
itself. Abstracting researchers from having to provide a dataset of social norms
and detect norm conformity, PRISONER could be developed to enforce this auto-
matically, asking whether participants consent to data being shared when re-
quests are made by experimental applications, and using norm conformity as a
proxy for asking explicitly every time, where appropriate.
In Chapter 5, we proposed a method for acquiring consent in SNS stud-
ies based on contextual integrity. We found that a quarter of the population
conform to social norms of willingness to share SNS data with researchers.
For these people, our method could be used as a proxy for asking them on an
ongoing basis about their willingness to share data, while still meeting their
expectations of what would be collected. This result has implications for re-
searchers conducting similar studies. With the academic community confront-
ing the issue of how to acquire consent for “big data” experiments, we have
demonstrated that a large proportion of the population can be served by such
a method. In addition, the method can detect if it is not appropriate after a
small number of interventions, automatically regressing to a traditional sus-
tained consent approach where participants are asked to give explicit consent
to data sharing.
This work has demonstrated the feasibility of such a method, but there are
limitations to the current implementation. First, our method depends on the
availability of existing social norms data that can be used to detect whether par-
ticipants are norm-conformant or not. Our study showed that a dataset that
was collected more than two years earlier and with a different population was
robust to these differences and was still a useful measure of norms. We cannot,
however, guarantee that this would be the case in all contexts, and research-
ers would need to evaluate the source of their social norms before determining
whether it is appropriate for their study. To simplify this process, we anticipate
that future implementations of the contextual integrity consent method could
147
collect and determine social norms while the study is running. As more parti-
cipants take part, the precision of the inferred norms would improve. Further
work is needed to assess the effectiveness of this, and the impact of bootstrap-
ping where no norms data are available.
In Chapter 6, we used contextual integrity to identify potential privacy breaches
in an incentivised location sharing system. Our application of the decision
heuristic focused on the first six steps necessary to render a prima facie judge-
ment as to whether contextual integrity may be violated. As this study focuses
on the relationship between the individual user, the operator of the ILS ser-
vice, and third-party advertisers, we believe this is an appropriate application
of the heuristic, and was sufficient for us to make a judgement. The remaining
three steps consider the wider moral, political, and social ramifications of the
process. One outcome of our study questioned whether people might feel com-
pelled to over-share their location out of financial need. While we did not see
evidence of this, it may be appropriate to examine these wider implications to
identify whether ILS could impact on other aspects of life.
We have shown that contextual integrity provides a framework that enables
the holistic examination of social network sites and their users. From the de-
velopment of tools to examine SNSs, through to the development of new meth-
odologies, and identifying and mitigating potential breaches in actual systems,
contextual integrity has provided a vocabulary for understanding the appropri-
ateness of data-handling throughout the process.
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Appendix A
Glossary
The following terms are explained throughout this thesis. For convenience,
their definitions are summarised here.
• Check-in: A colloquialism that refers to sharing one’s current location with
their social network on an LBSN.
• Context-relative informational norms: Describes how information appro-
priately flows in a given context, in terms of the senders and recipients,
the types of information, and the transmission principles that govern its
transmission.
• Context collapse: An emergent phenomenon on many social network sites,
where the real-life contextual distinctions between peers are removed,
making it difficult to target communications to meaningful subsets of
people.
• Contextual integrity: A theoretical framework for considering informa-
tion privacy that suggests privacy violations occur when people’s context-
relative informational norms are violated.
• Decision heuristic: A diagnostic that allows the application of contextual
integrity to determine whether a new process may violate privacy.
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• Facebook: One of the most-used social network sites, established in the
US in 2004.
• Foursquare: A popular location-based social network, which offers gami-
fied rewards to encourage people to share their location.
• GlobalPositioningSystem(GPS): A system that uses the position of satellites
relative to a receiver to be used to determine that receiver’s location.
• Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM): A set of protocols used to
deliver digital cellular communications, also known as 2G.
• Human subjects research: Research where there is any intervention or in-
teraction with other people in order to gather information, or where in-
formation that may identify someone else is collected.
• Incentivised location sharing (ILS): A practice on some location-based social
networks where users are offered a financial or tangible reward to share
their location, rather than a purely social motivation.
• Informed consent: A decision to participate in research taken by a compet-
ent individual who has received and understood all information, without
being coerced or induced into consenting.
• Institutional review board (IRB): An ethics committee that has oversight
over human subjects research to ensure it meets institutional and reg-
ulatory requirements.
• Location-basedservice (LBS): Any service that uses people’s current location
to deliver utility to users.
• Location-based social network (LBSN): A form of social network site dedic-
ated to the recording and share of one’s location with their peers.
• Mobileadvertising: The use of wireless data protocols and location-sensing
technologies to deliver advertisements to users on their mobile devices.
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• Privacycalculus: The risk-benefit analysis performedwhen decidingwhether
to disclose information, balancing the potential effects of being exposed
against the utility that might be gained.
• Purpose-driven sharing: A form of location-sharing motivated by utilit-
arian purposes such as coordinating a meeting.
• Quidco: An incentivised location sharing service that offers small cash in-
centives to people who check-in to a business and share this with their
social network.
• Reproducibility: The ability to repeat the procedures of an experiment, and
to understand the provenance of results.
• Secured consent: Consent that is provided at a single point in time, such
as at the start of an experiment.
• Short message service (SMS): A standard for sending short text messages
between mobile phones over GSM.
• Smartphone: A class of mobile phone often characterised by large displays,
significant computational power, sensing capabilities and the ability to
connect to the Internet.
• Social capital: The resources that can be extracted from a network of mutu-
ally acknowledged relationships, allowing people to use such relationships
to advance their own interests.
• Social-driven sharing: A form of location-sharing motivated by social cap-
ital building and impression management, rather than the utility of the
disclosed location.
• Social network site (SNS): Web-based services that allow people to share
content with a curated set of peers.
• Sustained consent: When consent is reacquired at regular intervals, ie.
whenever new data are collected.
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• Transmission principles: The rules that govern the appropriate flow of in-
formation, such as whether confidentiality or reciprocity is expected.
• Twitter: A popular social network site, distinguished from some compet-
itors such as Facebook by its underlying directed graph that distinguishes
between who a person follows, and is followed by.
• WirelessApplicationProtocol (WAP): An early protocol for transmitting sim-
plified Web content to mobile phones over GSM, superseded by the ability
to directly access the Internet from modern smartphones.
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Appendix B
Ethics approval
Two of the experiments discussed in this thesis involved human participation
and were thus scrutinised and approved by the University of St Andrews’ Teach-
ing and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC). Confirmation of approval for both
of these experiments, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, are included
on the following pages.
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Appendix C
IUIPCQuestionnaire
The following questionnaire was presented to participants at the beginning and
end of the experiment discussed in Chapter 6, based on the Internet Users’ In-
formation Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale [82]. Participants were asked to an-
swer on a seven-point Likert scale, with responses ranging through “strongly
disagree”, “disagree”, “somewhat disagree”, “neutral”, “somewhat agree”,
“agree”, and “strongly agree”.
1. Online privacy is really amatter ofmy right to exercise control and autonomy
over decisions about how my information is collected, used and shared.
2. Control of my personal information lies at the heart of privacy.
3. I believe online privacy is invaded when control is lost or unwillingly re-
duced as a result of a marketing transaction.
4. Companies seeking information online should disclose the way data are
collected, processed, and used.
5. A good online privacy policy should have a clear and conspicuous disclos-
ure.
6. It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about how
my personal information will be used.
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7. It usually bothers me when online companies ask me for personal inform-
ation.
8. When online companies ask me for personal information, I sometimes
think twice before providing it.
9. It bothers me to give personal information to so many online companies.
10. I’m concerned that online companies are collecting too much personal in-
formation about me.
11. Online companies should not use personal information for any purpose
unless it has been authorised by the individuals who provided information.
12. When people give personal information to an online company for some
reason, the online company should never use the information for any other
reason.
13. Online companies should never sell the personal information in their com-
puter databases to other companies.
14. Online companies should never share personal informationwith other com-
panies unless it has been authorized by the individuals who provided the
information.
15. If I receive a financial incentive to share my location, the business oper-
ating that location is entitled to receive some personal information about
me.
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